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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to pursue the posthumous conversation started by Jacques 
Lacan and Maurice Merleau-Ponty during the last century. We are entitled to think that the 
friendly and critical exchange between psychoanalysis and phenomenology has not reached a 
climax point in which it can be asserted that there is no place for further research in this field. 
The legitimacy of our project is proven by the common preoccupation of Lacan and Merleau-
Ponty, namely, the human enigma and the relation with the other. The investigation of the human 
leads Lacan to elaborate a topology that will help us to grasp the spatial structure of being, and 
which Merleau-Ponty will investigate, at the end of his work, as the ontology of the flesh. 
Conversely, thanks to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, Lacan’s psychoanalysis sees itself 
stripped of mathematic dogmatism.  
For Merleau-Ponty, renewal of philosophy cannot be achieved without the contribution of 
psychoanalysis. The new approach will lead to a new elucidation of the notion of being in 
nature. Returning to the things themselves, Merleau-Ponty shows that Nature is not an object of 
knowledge or a positive science, but an original dimension of Being from where we emerged. In 
his last work, Merleau-Ponty is inspired by Freud’s psychoanalysis; he is immediately interested 
in the chiasm that exists between spirit and body, flesh and language and human and nature. The 
concept of chiasm and the related concept of flesh, allow Merleau-Ponty to think the openness of 
being as a movement of the seeing-seen. Flesh is another notion for the unconscious. The 
unconscious will change the conception of the human being. Freud argues that there is an 
unconscious determinism that organises our life. This determinism is revealed, later, by Lacan, 
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as the function of language.  
The apparent obvious function of language is, for Lacan and Merleau-Ponty, the notion 
that describes the way in which we house the world, namely, chiasmatically, through transferral. 
I will show that the psychoanalysis of nature denotes the ‘tangled’ connection between human 
and nature, spirit and body, a connection that is intrinsically supported by language.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III | P a g e  
 
 
Contents 
 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................... IV 
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 1 
LIVING WITH ONE ANOTHER IN THE WORLD ............................................................. 14 
THE BODY AS THE FIRST INSTITUTION IN THE LIFEWORLD .......................................................... 19 
The Body and its psychoanalytic implications ...................................................................... 30 
THE MIRROR STAGE IN MERLEAU-PONTY’S THINKING ............................................................... 35 
THE MIRROR STAGE IN LACAN’S THINKING ................................................................................ 41 
THE CONCEPT OF NATURE IN MERLEAU-PONTY’S THINKING ............................. 48 
THE PROGRESSIVE FORM OF NATURE ......................................................................................... 52 
THE UNCONSCIOUS, LIBIDINAL BODY, DESIRE AND THE TISSUE OF THE WORLD .......................... 57 
AGAINST THE CURRENT .............................................................................................................. 66 
THE CHIASMATIC WORLD .................................................................................................. 80 
THE SENSIBLE WORLD AND THE USE OF LANGUAGE .................................................................... 81 
SEXUALITY AND EXPRESSION ..................................................................................................... 83 
TOPOLOGY OF THE BODY AND TRANSFERENCE ........................................................................... 86 
Lacanian topology ................................................................................................................. 91 
The possibility of transference ............................................................................................... 94 
THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF NATURE ............................................................................................. 98 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 106 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV | P a g e  
 
 
List of figures 
 
Figure 1 The Saussurean algorithm, Jacques Lacan Écrits........................................................... 73 
Figure 2 The Diagram of sexual difference, Jacques Lacan, Séminaire XX. ................................ 76 
Figure 3 The Torus, Jacques Lacan, Séminaire IX, 1961-1962. ................................................... 88 
Figure 4 Möbius Strip II, M. C. Escher, The Graphic Work of M.C. Escher ............................... 94 
1 | P a g e  
 
 
Psychoanalysis of Nature, 
The Mutual Transference Between The Body and The World 
Introduction  
 
During the 1950s and 1960s in France, both psychoanalysis and phenomenology changed 
the way the world was to be seen. The roots of this new perspective are at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, when both psychoanalysis and phenomenology were born. Beginning with 
Sigmund Freud, psychoanalysis was meant to be an applicable set of psychotherapeutic theories 
and associated techniques, used in order to reset the hysterical and obsessional neurosis. At the 
same time and on the other side of scientific world, Edmund Husserl developed a new 
philosophical method, phenomenology, in his work, Logical Investigations (The Prolegomena of 
Pure Logic) 1900-1901. Later, Husserl elaborated a theoretical structure of experience and 
consciousness, while looking to develop a new rigorous science, transcendental phenomenology. 
Therefore, in the France of the 1950s and 1960s psychoanalysis and phenomenology met through 
their most important representatives at that time, Jacques Lacan and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
This thesis will discuss some aspects of this union. 
Merleau-Ponty was one of the first scholars who tried to include some concepts from 
psychoanalytical literature in phenomenology. Lacan affirms, in The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, that Merleau-Ponty’s direction is towards a metaphysical 
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perspective on psychoanalysis.
1
 In some of his working notes from The Visible and the Invisible, 
Merleau-Ponty refers to a “psychoanalysis of nature” and an “ontological psychoanalysis”: “Do a 
psychoanalysis of Nature: it is the flesh, the mother (Faire une psychanalyse de la nature: C’est 
la chair, la mère). A philosophy of flesh is the condition without which psychoanalysis remains 
anthropology.”2 In this way, Merleau-Ponty clings to Freud’s work, whose interrogations are 
centered on humans and their impulses and desires as elementary principles of life. This 
perspective allows us to understand the anthropomorphic structure of nature and the living and to 
reverse the ontological paradigm: the human and cultural dimension is repositioned and 
redesigned in the context of an ontology that defines Being as nature.  
The psychoanalysis of Nature, for Merleau-Ponty, posits a unity between Nature (Physis) 
and Logos: the relation between Nature and Logos emerges in a primordial world, a world that is 
already there. In the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty affirms that there is no nature 
in itself. Nature and history are inseparable, because all natural phenomena are, from the 
beginning, part of cultural and historical orders: “Laplace’s nebula is not behind us, at our 
remote beginnings, but in front of us in the cultural world.”3 How is this unity, between Nature 
and Logos, possible? Merleau-Ponty’s answer is: the body, because the body is the first 
institution in the world. The world and its significations lie in front of us from the beginning of 
our physical birth as natural organisms. Thus, the body becomes a cultural object, expression 
itself, the trace or the sedimentation of an existence. Michel Foucault says about the 
Phenomenology of Perception that nature and logos form a unity from the beginning of the 
world: “In this text, the body-organism is linked to the world through a network of primal 
                                                          
1
 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 
London, 1998), p., 90. 
2
 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (North Western University Press, Evanston 1968), p. 267.  
3
 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (Routledge, London and New York, 2002), p. 502. 
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significations, which arise from the perception of things.”4 The body becomes the first institution 
in the world. The body is, furthermore, committed to otherness. The concept of the body is 
developed in psychoanalysis in the same ‘key’.  
The non-specific character of the body places it entre-deux (between two). It allows the 
intertwining between organic and psychic, nature and culture. The dualism psychic-organic is 
overcome by Freud’s theories of hysterical conversion and drives (and, later, by Lacan, through 
the introduction of the concepts of specular image, Borromean knot and subject as the effect of 
language). Hysteria made Freud understand the sensitivity of the body to unconscious 
representations. The unconscious is the psychical system through which Freud unifies the human 
being as organism (the organic body) and as psychical/spiritual being. According to Merleau-
Ponty, the unconscious is the element that Freud introduced entre-deux the somatic and the 
psychic: 
With psychoanalysis the spirit passes into the body and, vice versa, the body passes into 
the spirit. This research cannot miss the reverse, the idea that, at the same time, our body 
is what we know about its partner [concept], spirit. I have to admit that there is a lot to do 
in order to understand the whole content of the psychoanalytical experience […] To take 
into account this osmosis, between the anonymous life of the body and the official life of 
a person, and this is Freud’s great discovery, we have to introduce something between the 
organism and us, as made up of deliberate acts and express knowledge. This is Freud’s 
unconscious.
5
 
 
Freud’s unconscious represents the starting point, for Merleau-Ponty. He will use the analytic 
process of the unconscious as an introductory method to show the primordial or natural 
                                                          
4
 Michel Foucault, Theatrum philosophicum, Critique 282 (1970), « ici, le corps-organisme était lie au monde par 
une réseau de signification originaires que la perception des choses mêmes faisait lever. » pp. 885-908.  
5
 Merleau-Ponty, L’homme et l’adversité, in Signes (édition électronique réalisée par Pierre Patenaude, Québec, 
2011) : « Avec la psychanalyse l’esprit passe dans le corps comme inversement le corps passe dans l’esprit. Ces 
recherches ne peuvent manquer de bouleverser en même temps que notre idée du corps, celle que nous nous faisons 
de son partenaire, l’esprit. Il faut avouer qu’il reste ici encore beaucoup à faire pour tirer l’expérience 
psychanalytique tout ce qu’elle contient […] Pour rendre compte de cet osmose entre le vie anonyme de corps et de 
la vie officielle de la personne, que est la grande découvert de Freud, il fallait introduire quelque chose entre 
l’organisme et nous-mêmes comme suite d’actes délibères, de connaissance expresse. Ce fut l’inconsciente de 
Freud. » p. 227.  
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dimension of human existence, which Freud calls ‘instinctual drives’ and Merleau-Ponty ‘flesh’ 
(chair). 
Merleau-Ponty approaches Freud’s thinking by way of the notion of flesh: “the 
philosophy of Freud is not a philosophy of the body but of the flesh.”6 The organic and the 
psychic are mediated, according to Merleau-Ponty, by flesh. The flesh is “this fact that the body 
is passive-active (visible-seeing), mass in itself and gesture.”7 The body becomes a mirror 
phenomenon, when the body has its own relation with itself: the body is visible but, also, it is a 
seer. According to Renaud Barbaras, the concept of the flesh in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy 
represents one of the deepest connections between psychoanalysis and phenomenology. The 
flesh corresponds to the Freudian process of cathexis.
8
 Cathexis is the psychic energy, in the 
psychoanalytical model, of a postulated unconscious mental functioning on a level between 
biology and consciousness. Accordingly, flesh can be defined as a process of investment of 
mental and emotional energy in a person; flesh denotes the limit-concept that brings together the 
somatic and the psychic. 
 The articulation of the flesh will allow Merleau-Ponty to develop the concept of chiasme. 
The relation between somatic and psychic, mediated by flesh, is an intertwining relationship. The 
notion of chiasm designates the relation of a human being to herself and also the relation with the 
other, and with the world. The chiasm is a reversible and simultaneous movement, whereby any 
activity is, as an interior condition of its process, at the same time, a passivity. For instance, the 
one who sees, touches or speaks, is, as well, visible, tangible and spoken.
9
 This relation is 
reversible, but it is actualized only in the moment when Merleau-Ponty introduces the concept of 
                                                          
6
 Ibid., The Visible and the Invisible, p. 270. 
7
 Merleau-Ponty, p. 271.  
8
 Renaud Barbaras, Le conscient et l’inconscient, in Notion de philosophie, Tome 1 (Paris, Gallimard, 1995), pp. 
489-548. 
9
 Pascal Dupont, Dictionnaire Merleau-Ponty (Ellipses Édition, Paris, 2008), p. 20. 
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the flesh: flesh represents the invisible membrane that makes possible the unity of opposites. The 
unity is a process, a relation between us and the body, and as well between us and the world. The 
exterior-interior, passive-active reciprocating process, which is mediated by the flesh, resembles 
a mirror that reflects in its interior the exterior of the world. “The flesh is a mirror phenomenon”, 
as Merleau-Ponty asserts in The Visible and the Invisible, which allows communication between 
the image of the body and us, or between the image of the world and us.
10
 As a mediator, the 
flesh is the flesh of the body (the perceiving body) and tangible objects (perceived objects) are 
the flesh of the world. The flesh is an organ of knowledge; the body as flesh is a privileged way 
through which the limit between spirit and world is themed. The body becomes that ‘entity’ that 
supports the cross of the chiasm.  
Now, if we move our gaze to psychoanalytical discourse, we can observe a synonymy 
between the notions of transference and chiasm. Establishing this synonymy is one of the goals 
of this thesis.  
The notion of transference arose in Freud’s work as a common term for displacement of 
affect from one idea to another:
11
  
… ideas which originally had only a weak charge of intensity take over the charge from 
ideas which were originally intensely cathected and at last attain enough strength to 
enable them to force an entry into consciousness. Displacements of this kind are no 
surprise to us where it is a question of dealing with quantities of affect or with motor 
activities in general. When a lonely old maid transfers her affection to animals, or a 
bachelor becomes an enthusiastic collector, when a soldier defends a scrap of coloured 
cloth – flag – with his life’s blood, when a few seconds’ extra pressure in a hand-shake 
means bliss to a lover, or when, in Othello, a lost handkerchief precipitates an outburst of 
rage – all of these are instances of psychical displacements to which we raise no 
objection.
12
  
 
                                                          
10
 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, pp. 255-256. 
11
 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (Basic Book, New York, 2010), chapter V and VII.  
12
 Ibid., p. 200. 
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Later, Freud will use the concept of transference to designate the patient’s relationship with the 
analyst. Freud observed the intensity of the patient’s affective reactions to the doctor, for the first 
time, in Breuer’s treatments of Anna O. Freud affirmed that the patient transfers unconscious 
ideas onto the doctor.
13
 At first, Freud saw transference as a resistance that obstructs the recall of 
repressed memories, an obstacle that must be eliminated. As he developed psychoanalytical 
theory, Freud found a ‘positive’ view of transference. The analysand is facing her history in the 
immediacy of the present relationship with the analyst. In transference, the analysand, inevitably, 
repeats earlier relationships with other figures (especially with parental figures).  
The dynamic of the analysand-analyst relationship will become the central meaning of 
transference, and this sense remains, till today, a summary of the entire psychoanalytical process. 
In Lacan’s theory we may observe some annotations regarding transference. Lacan’s notion of 
transference goes through several stages. In An Intervention on the Transference, Lacan affirms: 
“Transference does not fall under any mysterious property of affectivity and, even when it 
reveals itself in an emotional [émoi] guise, this guise has a meaning only as a function of the 
dialectical moment at which it occurs.”14 For Lacan, transference is not defined in terms of 
affects; even if transference manifests itself in the form of particularly strong affects, such as 
love or hate, it does not consist of such emotions, but in the structure of an intersubjective 
relationship. In this respect, Lacan locates the essence of transference in the symbolic rather than 
the imaginary order.
15
 
The function of the symbolic is clarified in Lacan’s development of the theory of 
transference in relation to the concept of gift exchange in Marcel Mauss and Claude Lévi-
                                                          
13
 Sigmund Freud, Study on Hysteria 1985 d (Ivan Smith 2010, pdf edition), pp. 268-269.  
14
 Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (Routledge, London and New York, 1996), 
p. 213. 
15
 Ibid. 
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Strauss. In a gift economy the value is not traded or sold, but rather given without an explicit 
agreement for immediate or future rewards. Unlike the market and barter economies, where 
goods and services are primarily exchanged for value received, in gift exchange (or the gift 
economy) the object (or service) that is given is not alienated from the giver; the object is lent 
rather than sold or ceded. The identity of the giver is bound up with the gift. Being part of a 
subject, the given object acquires a power that compels the recipient to reciprocate; so the 
inalienable object must be returned, because the act of giving creates a gift-debt that has to be 
repaid. 
The notion of an expected return of the gift creates a relationship over time between two 
individuals: giver and giftee. According to Levi-Strauss, the giver-giftee relationship is 
structured by certain laws which regulate kinship relations.
16
 These structural laws are atemporal 
and regulate social life. For Levi-Strauss, these laws, as an aggregate, form what psychoanalysis 
would call the unconscious.
17
 The unconscious is a trans-individual psychical system. The 
unconscious is reducible to a function, specifically, according to Levi-Strauss, the symbolic 
function. The symbolic function, which no doubt is specifically human, and which is carried out 
according to the same laws among all men, is, for Levi-Strauss, nothing but the aggregate of 
these laws.
18
  
For Lacan, the symbolic function acts as a fundamental substrate of the world by way of 
gift exchange type relations. The world is sustained by reciprocal ‘transactions’ that act like a 
symbolic network. Transference involves an exchange of signs in which speaker and listener are 
transformed, as the other is ‘compelled’ to reciprocate. This unified active-passive process 
defines, as we shall see, Merleau-Ponty’s theory of chiasm as well.  
                                                          
16
 Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology (Basic Book, New York, 1963), pp. 202-203 
17
 Ibid.  
18
 Ibid. 
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For Merleau-Ponty the intertwining process is named chiasm. A chiasm unites opposites 
and, at the same time, allows a reversible movement between them. Chiasm is defined as identity 
through opposition, a process which opens the doors to the world’s phenomena. In explicit 
contrast with Hegel, for whom the dialectical movement was, Merleau-Ponty claims, an 
“explicative principle”,19 Merleau-Ponty’s dialectic consists in the incompletion in principle of 
the world. The incompletion founds an indefinite and permanent opening.
20
 The double 
movement of the thing itself is the point where the two movements making up this single 
movement cross. This is where “there is something,”21 where there is “an openness.”22  The 
essence of this process, stated above, is flesh. The flesh ‘allows’ the inscription of the psychic on 
the body. According to Renaud Barbaras, in the flesh, the unconscious constitutes the essence of 
the conscious;
23
 the unconscious has the power to determine conscious life. This relationship 
between unconscious and conscious is yet more complex. 
Barbaras holds that Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm designates a complex relation 
between body and world.
24
 Perception, as part of the flesh, is my initiative and a manifestation of 
the world.
25
 The structure of this relation contains four notions, which are grouped two by two in 
an intertwining relationship: 
 the perceiving subjectivity (the touching),  
 the body (the touched),  
 the world as a space which contains the body, 
                                                          
19
 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, pp. 91-93. 
20
 Ibid., p. 26-28. 
21
 Ibid., p. 95. 
22
 Ibid., p. 99. 
23
 Renaud Barbaras, Le conscient et l’inconscient, pp. 489-548. 
24
 Renaud Barbaras, Merleau-Ponty, (édition Ellipses, Paris 1997), pp. 52-53. 
25
 Ibid. 
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 the world as it appears to this body.26  
As Merleau-Ponty explains, a chiasm is a reversible process:  
The chiasm, reversibility, the idea that every perception is doubled with a counter 
perception (Kant’s real opposition), is an act with two faces, one no longer knows who 
speaks and who listens. Speaking-listening, seeing-being seen, perceiving-being 
perceived circularity (it is because of it that it seems to us that perception forms itself in 
the things themselves) – Activity = passivity.27  
 
Between activity and passivity there is a line, a boundary surface, where we find the veering I-
Other and Other-I.
28
 The I-Other and Other-I cannot be understood as two ‘entities’, for 
example, for itself and for other: “In reality there is neither me nor the other as positive, positive 
subjectivities. There are two caverns, two openings, two stages where something will take place 
– and which both belong to the same world, to the stage of Being.”29 The I-Other and Other-I are 
each the other side of the other, “they incorporate one another.”30 Therefore, the line that borders 
the surface of this passage is the flesh, which acts like a mirror. The mirror creates the image of 
the body and the world.  
To show that the psychoanalysis of nature refers to the (intra) worldly relation, between 
us and the other, and between us and world, I will start this dissertation with an analysis of 
Husserl’s concept of Lebenswelt. The late Husserl prepared, indirectly, the ‘field’ for a 
theoretical debate, a possible meeting, between Lacan and Merleau-Ponty. This ‘field’ brings 
together “two different forms of psychoanalysis.”31 One is Lacan’s psychoanalysis, which 
remains, in some way, circumscribed to the history of psychoanalysis, starting with Freud. The 
other one is Merleau-Ponty’s psychoanalysis, namely, the psychoanalysis of nature.  
                                                          
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, pp. 264-265.  
28
 Ibid., p. 263. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid.  
31
 Guy-Félix Duportail,  Les institutions du monde de la vie, Merleau-ponty et Lacan (édition Jérôme Million, 
Grenoble, 2008), p. 221. 
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The intuition of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) – originally used by Husserl in The Crisis in 
the sense of the world of life or the world for life – unfolds only in its dependency on life as 
meaning. The lifeworld, for Husserl, is the world experienced in relation to the determinations of 
our values, our practices and the end of our experiences.
32
 Lifeworld is also the ‘surrounding 
world’ (Umwelt) that we take for granted.33 For Husserl meaning is imposed by the 
transcendental ego, the conscious.  
There is an original meaning of nature, Merleau-Ponty states, which is not linked with 
any transcendental activity of the ego, but is closer to vegetative life.
34
 In other words, for 
Merleau-Ponty, life as meaning is nature.
35
 For Merleau-Ponty, people are the subjects of the 
lifeworld. For that reason, a person cannot be reduced to an act or a representation, because he is 
life itself. If ‘to live’, for Husserl, means to live in a certainty of the world, and this certainty is 
given by conscious life, for Merleau-Ponty, ‘to live’ means to be, in a way, a being of ‘meaning’. 
And such meaning is first institutionalised by the body as the first expression of the world. 
  To treat the body as the first institution in the world is a first step to a psychoanalysis of 
nature. As part of nature, the body has an impulse to create meaning, as Merleau-Ponty states: 
“There is nature wherever there is a life that has meaning, but where, however, there is no 
thought; hence the kinship with the vegetative: Nature is what has a meaning, without this 
meaning being posited by thought: it is the auto-production of a meaning.”36 
The second step in my approach to a psychoanalysis of nature is to expound the concept 
of nature. Nature, the primordial, in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, is the original constitutive 
                                                          
32
 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Northwestern University 
Press, Evanston, 1970), p. 218. 
33
 Ibid., p. 6. 
34
Merleau-Ponty, La Nature, Notes Cours du Collège de France (édition du Seuil, Paris 1995) pp. 19-20.  
35
 Ibid.  
36
 Merleau-Ponty, La Nature, Notes Cours du Collège de France (Edition du Seuil, Paris 1995), « Il y a nature 
partout où il y a une vie qui a un sens, mais où, cependant, il n’y a pas de pensée ; d’ où la parenté avec le végétal : 
est nature qui a un sens, sans que ce sens ait été posé par la pensée. C’est l’autoproduction d’un sens », pp. 19-20. 
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principle; nature is the tissue of the dynamism of our existence, and of life. Merleau-Ponty 
develops the idea of natural production as ‘latent intentionality’. Accordingly, Nature is not 
causality or finality, but will. And this principle – Nature as will – supports us and helps us to 
bring to the surface – from its silence – the meaning of the world. Nature is meaning in itself; it 
is the auto-production of its own meaning. The body is embedded in nature. This nature becomes 
the sensible support for the body. The world acquires its meaning through a sort of transference 
between nature, as a whole, and the body. Transference is the psychoanalytic instrument through 
which Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology touches the beginning (Anfang) dimension of the world.  
In a typically enigmatic manner, Merleau-Ponty says of nature: “Nature is at first day: it 
is there today.” Nature transcends the past-present tense distinction. Nature is the union of what 
is past and what is present. Past and present are in each other. For Merleau-Ponty, this atemporal 
process is chiasm: a crossing, of one, over and into the other. The chiasm reveals the fact that 
nature has a present continuous tense form that brings together past and present.
37
 Nature is a 
concept that brings together opposites. All relations emerge in a primordial world that is always 
already there; there is a primordial unity from where all things emerge into the world.
38
 
However, this primordial unity neither creates itself (naturans) nor is it created by some other 
being (naturata); its paradoxical structure displays a unity in diversity: the being is created and, 
at the same time, is creating. 
The third step of a psychoanalysis of nature relates together chiasm and transference. 
Apparently two different concepts, with operational meanings in two different fields, they come 
together via Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh. The psychoanalysis of nature means the 
reversible relation between the body and the other that is nature.  
                                                          
37
 The future is a potential tense and it is part of the imaginary order. 
38
 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, pp, 193, 229, 230. 
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Conducting a topology of the body demonstrates that the body is a libidinal body. The 
libidinal body is the body that wants to jouir (“to enjoy”) inasmuch as there is a meaning that can 
mediate its jouissance (“enjoyment”). The topological analysis of the body expresses the 
meaning of the ontological metamorphosis of the body. The body expresses dimensions; to be 
more specific, three-dimensions: real, symbolic and imaginary. These three ‘dimensions’ or 
orders are connected, in Lacan’s theory, by three rings, showing the interdependence of the real, 
the symbolic and the imaginary. The imaginary order, in quick outline, is the effect of the 
specular image of the body in the mirror. The real is the order which cannot by symbolised. The 
real body is, every time, “lost”. What is lost is replaced by the symbolic. The symbolic body is 
constituted by language, by signifiers. 
 The multi-dimensional body is part of the world, as a constitutional element of an 
ontological intertwining, a body-world. To live in this world is possible only through the sensible 
embodiment of the perceiving and the perceived, which is a result of the carnal connection 
between exterior and interior. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the psychoanalysis of nature denotes 
the transference – a reversible ‘movement’ mediated by the flesh – between myself and the other. 
This intertwining originates in the life movement which separates and connects contraries. 
In closing, we will show that a psychoanalysis of nature is closely linked to the reversible 
passage that occurs in between and which defines the term ‘chiasm’. This passage is the interval 
that allows the ‘embodiment’ of language as a path from a silent stage of nature to an uttered 
stage (logos proforikos) and vice versa. The structure of this passage (part of the transference 
structure or chiasm) is organized like a language. The passage is the moment when and where 
language is born. There is a dimension of silence through which we cast meanings, symbols, etc; 
as Merleau-Ponty states: “… language lives only from silence; everything we cast to the other 
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has germinated in this great mute land which we never leave.”39 Therefore, every time we speak, 
listen or look to the other, and vice versa, the passage is open (is active, or as the Greeks would 
say, energeia). As speaking beings, we can say that we are, all the time, in a perpetual passage. 
We could say we are in a perpetual cultural contract, because “the vision itself, the thought itself, 
are, as has been said, structured as a language, are articulation before the letter, apparition of 
something where there was nothing or something else.”40 Therefore, a psychoanalysis of nature 
presupposes, like in standard psychoanalysis, a passage between the body (as embodied being) 
and world.
41
 This passage is automatically established, since our ‘fall in to the world’. We will 
show that the psychoanalysis of Nature is about this passage, as “barbaric principle,” that 
underlies the entire socius. The passage remains, necessarily, at the same time, open and 
unknowable, but this is the way in which Merleau-Ponty sees the psychoanalysis of Nature: as 
something open towards a philosophy of interrogation.
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41
 In standard psychoanalysis, the link is between a patient and the psychoanalyst.  
 
 
  
Living with One Another in the World 
 
In his essay ‘A Phenomenology of Life’, Renaud Barbaras asserts that Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology “is really a phenomenology of life” and that this approach has its roots in 
Husserl’s phenomenology. According to Barbaras, “Merleau-Ponty’s main purpose, from 
beginning to end, is to give sense to the Husserlian lifeworld (Lebenswelt) as it is described in 
The Crisis.”1 Beginning with Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty tried to complete 
Husserl’s phenomenology, reconfiguring what he took to be both Husserl’s dualist and 
transcendental thinking. The author of Phenomenology of Perception calls into question the 
distinctive, strict opposition, in Husserl’s thinking, between the world and transcendental 
subjectivity. There is a connection, according to Merleau-Ponty, between the natural and 
transcendental attitudes.  If we refer to the “life” of worldly existence, the life of a living being as 
Umweltding, then we have in view a natural existence in the world. Merleau-Ponty conceives 
natural life as a matter of a primal faith in existence which cannot be overcome (unless we define 
the natural world by already projecting into it the attitude and categories of science.)
2
 Therefore, 
if we refer to life as an object of a scientific discipline, as Naturding, we will change the natural 
attitude of the world into a naturalistic one. The concept ‘naturalism’ has no very precise 
meaning in contemporary philosophy. In this case, it denotes objectivism because the 
construction and conceptual signification of philosophy is nothing else than faith, a belief from 
which emerge all our practical and theoretical actions. This belief, as constituent of our 
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2
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subjective activities, is identical with Husserl’s concepts of Urdoxa or Urglaube, an opinion or 
primordial faith that represents for Husserl all intentional relations. For Husserl this kind of 
opinion was not sufficient and he adds, to this belief, an act or a judgement as a primordial 
‘gesture’ (‘these’ or Weltthese). 
Merleau-Ponty’s aim is to develop a new phenomenology that takes into account the 
irreducibility of the Lebenswelt. The “saga” of the natural and transcendental attitudes will lead 
Merleau-Ponty to assert: “There is no intelligible world, there is the sensible world.”3 Merleau-
Ponty differs with Husserl regarding the concept of lifeworld: 
Husserl in his last period concedes that all reflection should in the first place return to the 
description of the lifeworld (monde vécu) (Lebenswelt). But he adds that, by means of a 
second “reduction,” the structures of the lifeworld must be reinstated in the 
transcendental flow of the universal constitution in which all the world’s obscurities are 
elucidated. It is clear, however, that we are faced with a dilemma: either the constitution 
makes the world transparent, in which case it is not obvious why reflection needs to pass 
through the lifeworld, or else it retains something of that world and never rids it of its 
opacity.
4
 
 
If the lifeworld refers to a Weltthesis, prior to all theses, then, according to Merleau-
Ponty, this Weltthesis gives us not only a representation of the world but the world itself, as a full 
unity.
5
 If Lebenswelt involves an irreducible opacity, then the world is not constituted entirely in 
a transcendental subjectivity. The prior presence of the world is inconsistent with the acts of 
transcendental subjectivity, the opacity of the world with the transparency of the constitution of 
the world. This is the moment when Merleau-Ponty leaves Husserl’s phenomenological project. 
The transcendental subject is, then, not relevant for a description of the natural world, and for 
that reason the subject of the Welthesis must be explained.
6
 According to Barbaras, Merleau-
                                                          
3
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4
 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (Routledge, New York and London, 2005), p. 425. 
5
 Merleau-Ponty, VI, p. 3.  
6
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Ponty is trying to define more precisely the status of the subject as a subject of Weltthesis, or, in 
other words, as subject of a lifeworld. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, the subject of a lifeworld cannot 
be reduced to an act or a representation. 
So what does it mean to live? According to Husserl “to live is always to live-in-certainty-
of-the-world.”7 For Husserl, this certainty of the world is given by conscious life, and so 
transcendental activity is part of life. He writes in The Crisis:  
The world is pregiven to us, the waking, always somehow practically interested subjects, 
not occasionally but always and necessarily, as the universal field of all actual and 
possible praxis, as horizon. To live is always to live-in-certainty-of the world. Waking 
life is being awake to the world, being constantly and directly “conscious” of the world 
and oneself as living in the world, actually experiencing [erleben] and actually affecting 
the ontic certainty of the world. The world is pregiven thereby, in every case, in such way 
that individual things are given. But there exists a fundamental difference between the 
way we are conscious of the world and the way we are conscious of the things or objects 
(taken in the broadest sense, but still purely in the sense of the life-world), though 
together the two make up an inseparable unity.
8
 
 
Accordingly, to live is the momentary phase of consciousness. It does not refer to the present 
tense in relation with past and future tenses, but to a living present, in which the subject is aware 
of a temporal extent. For example, the subject is aware of a present perceiving as having 
originated with past, elapsed phenomena, as extended to the present, and as anticipating 
continuing appearances as the perception continues to develop into the future. The living present 
is a composite intentionality that includes primal impression, retention and protention and that 
explains the inner time-consciousness as well as the awareness of objective time. To live in 
certainty of the world means to live in a world that is taken for granted by the subject.  
                                                          
7
 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of Transcendental Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Northwestern 
University Press, Evanston 1970), p. 142. 
8
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In The Crisis, Husserl’s concern is also the dual status of the subject: a part of the world 
and as the condition of the world.  To explain this duality, Barbaras analyses the German term 
Lebenswelt:  
We must take into account the word Husserl originally used to refer to this world, 
namely, Lebenswelt, that is to say, the world of, or for, life. Husserl did not choose this 
word arbitrarily: he took advantage of the double meaning of Leben in German, which is 
ambiguous in French as well. The meaning of “to live” is originally intransitive: to live 
means to be alive; life is that which characterizes living beings. In German the verb leben 
becomes the verb erleben, which has a transitive meaning (as does vivre in French): it 
means to experience, to feel, to perceive, and thus refers to an object, either immanent 
(one can vivre or erleben an emotion, as in having a passionate love affair) or 
transcendent (vivre or erleben a situation). This duality corresponds to the duality 
between life as the object of biology and life as dimension of the transcendental flow, that 
is to say, as constituting the world. To ask about the subject of the Lebenswelt is to ask 
about life – life for which and by which there is a world, and this is to call into question 
the duality of the natural subject and the transcendental subject, to look for the unity of 
the subject beyond the distinction between empirical and the transcendental levels.
9
 
 
Barbaras’ perspective shows us the parallel Husserl established between transcendental and 
empirical consciousness. According to Husserl each attitude has the same goal, as a whole 
domain of transcendental experience.
10
 Yet, there is an irreducible difference between the two. 
On the one hand, psychology, as the field of empirical consciousness, refers to the subject as a 
part of the world.
11
 On the other hand, transcendental consciousness is the condition of the 
possibility of the world as phenomenon.
12
 According to Jacques Derrida, these attitudes build an 
irreducible unity that in the end represents life:  
But this strange unity of these two parallel, which refers the one to the other, does not 
allow itself to be sundered [partager] by them and by dividing itself, finally joins the 
transcendental to its other; this unity is life. One finds quickly enough that the sole 
nucleus of the concept of psuchȇ is life as self-relationship, whether or not it takes place 
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in the form of consciousness. ‘Living’ is thus the name of that which precedes the 
reduction and finally escapes all the divisions which the latter give rise to.
13
  
 
The parallelism between empirical consciousness and transcendental consciousness shows that 
life is itself ‘double’. Yet, unlike Merleau-Ponty, for whom both ‘attitudes’ are interconnected, in 
Husserl they are distant from one another. Derrida affirms that this difference represents 
“nothing”, because, in the end, nothing is the concept that defines the rupture between 
transcendental and empirical consciousness.
14
 As to be refers to a living being, that is, a worldly 
existence, ‘life’ presupposes the existence of the natural world. However, Husserl describes 
transcendental activity as life using, in his descriptions, concepts that are extracted from the 
domain of life in truth (Leben, Erlebnis, etc).
15
 In this way, life appears again on the 
transcendental level. Life cannot be (anymore) the object of the phenomenological reduction. 
Therefore, the distinction between transcendental and empirical consciousness is avoided. This 
means that life, as a fundamental characteristic of living beings, involves a dimension that 
exceeds the natural level, and that overlaps with the transcendental level.
16
 Life seems to acquire, 
thereby, a neutral meaning. Life is nothing, on this account, except as it sustains, in some way, 
the transcendental dimension, without being merged with it. At the same time, the nothing 
divides the transcendental and the empirical, or, as Barbaras states, “life is the condition of the 
possibility of the nothing as peculiar unity of transcendental phenomenology and 
phenomenological psychology.”17 Life as nothing gives a new meaning to worldliness as pre-
given world. In other words, life refers to a living being that is a worldly existence; it 
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 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1973), pp. 14-15. 
14
 Renauld Barbaras, Op. cit., pp. 206-207. 
15 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid., p. 208. 
19 | P a g e  
 
presupposes a natural existence of the world, and this existence divides the transcendental and 
psychological.    
Husserl’s pre-given world cannot be known in its entirety by the subject that appeals to 
the epochȇ. The world precedes the representational acts of transcendental subjectivity;18 life as 
transcendental subjectivity, thereby, does not make sense for Merleau-Ponty, for whom the 
subject is a natural individual in the lifeworld, one that cannot be reduced to a representation.
19
 
For Merleau-Ponty living (leben) and live (erleben) are forms of mutual coexistence:   
Living is a primary process from which, as a starting point, it becomes possible to live 
this or that world, and we must eat and breathe before perceiving and awakening to 
relational living, belonging to colors and lights through sight, to sounds through hearing, 
to the body of another through sexuality, before arriving at the life of human relation.
20
  
 
To live means to live through the body. At the same time, life itself transcends the organic body 
and involves the whole realm of meaning: “thus, as we need a sexual body to develop 
meaningful relationship with others, so, too, we must be alive and have sense organs to 
experience everything and, finally, to perceive the world.”21  
 
The body as the first institution in the lifeworld 
 
The natural world is the “Weltthesis prior to all theses,” as Merleau-Ponty highlights in 
Signes.
22
 This point of view will change in The Visible and the Invisible. In his later work, 
Merleau-Ponty asserts that the world is not a being, the Supreme Being, or the largest of objects 
that would contain within it all things. The world is the assembly of our experience as sensible 
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beings and as humans. Therefore, when we open our eyes we see the world itself. The world is 
what we see, yet, even so, we must learn how to look at it “in the sense that we must match this 
vision with knowledge, take possession of it, say what we and seeing are.”23 We have to act like 
we knew nothing about it and we have to learn everything from the beginning.
24
 Such a 
philosophy does not seek a verbal substitute for the world we perceive, but a new attitude of the 
philosopher which allows the world to take form continually within him. In this way, ‘the new 
philosopher’ can observe how the things themselves emerge from the depth of their silence.  
The philosopher acquires a new role in Merleau-Ponty’s The Visible and the Invisible, 
replacing the psychoanalyst in the pursuit of a psychoanalysis of nature. The philosopher 
becomes a psychoanalyst of nature charged with interpreting the “symptoms of the world”. For 
philosophers, in Merleau-Ponty’s conception, the unmediated contact with the world (in other 
words a pre-reflective stage) presupposes a phenomenological reduction, a return to the things 
themselves from where begins the analysis of the world.  
Merleau-Ponty affirms, right at the start of The Visible and the Invisible, that the 
philosopher is: 
 … obliged to reinspect and redefine the most well-grounded notions, to create new ones, 
with new words to designate them, to undertake a true reform of the understanding – at 
whose term the evidence of the world, which seemed indeed to be the clearest of truths, is 
supported by the seemingly most sophisticated thoughts, before which the natural man 
now no longer recognizes where he stood…. The fact that the philosopher claims to 
speak in the very name of the naïve evidence of the world, that he refrains from adding 
anything to it, that he limits himself to drawing out all its consequences, does not excuse 
him; on the contrary he dispossesses [humanity] only the more completely, inviting it to 
think of itself as an enigma.
25
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The pre-reflective stage is a stage of interrogation. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical method is a 
philosophy of interrogation. Interrogation is a form of expression through which one sees “our 
relationship with Being”.26 The interrogation is not “a mode derived by inversion or by reversal 
of the indicative and of the positive, is neither an affirmation nor a negation veiled or expected, 
but an original manner of aiming at something, as it were a question-knowing, which by principle 
no statement or answer can go beyond.” 27 Interrogative philosophy is not a philosophy that 
offers answers or spreads theses; it is not a science that takes Being as an object. Interrogation is 
a permanent attitude attempting to question Being. Interrogation remains open as a manner of 
gearing into the trajectory of sense. Philosophy looks for a mode of interrogation that takes up a 
trajectory of meaning. That trajectory repeats and reshapes sense through a coherent 
deformation, as the world itself is a coherent deformation. The pre-established harmony of the 
world is a unity prior to division into “me-world, world and its parts, parts of my body.”28  
In order to implement this philosophy of interrogation the philosopher will go back to a 
pre-reflective stage, in the sense of a naïve, natural attitude, which helps her to dispossess 
humanity of all predicates.
29
 According to Merleau-Ponty, through perceptual faith I perceive the 
world itself, not a representation of the world. The word ‘faith’ should be understood as 
something before any position, a foi animale.
30
  
The field of faith is not a transcendental realm. Life, therefore, is not any longer 
understood as transcendental life. Life as world is given to us, through perceptual faith, in a pre-
reflective stage. This is, in fact, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological reduction. Whereas, for 
Husserl, transcendental life objectifies itself in the empirical world, for Merleau-Ponty, life is 
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already objectified in chiasm. The chiasm shows that the meaning of to be in the interior and the 
meaning of to be in the exterior are not two different phenomenological perspectives. In other 
words, the passage that begins with the exteriorisation of the expression (enunciation) is the only 
way towards the interior of thinking. The chiasm is “the inside and the outside articulated over 
one another.”31 Unlike Husserl, Merleau-Ponty does not put the entirety of existence under the 
notion of the ‘transcendental ego’. Chiasm denotes in itself, if I can say so, a simultaneous 
process that refuses to break the world down into dichotomies (interior-exterior, finite-infinite 
and body-world).  
In Cartesian Meditations, Husserl writes: 
Transcendency in every form is an immanent existential characteristic, constituted within 
the ego. Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being, whether the latter is called 
immanent or transcendent, falls within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the 
subjectivity that constitutes sense and being.
32
  
 
Furthermore, according to Husserl, the constitution of life is world thematization, as formation of 
sense. The constitution of the world supposes a field of semantic possibilities within the 
transcendental ego.
33
 These semantic possibilities should be understood as a group of possible 
significations that always precede the facts as given. The transcendental self-explanation of the 
ego, as a field of transcendental experience, puts us in front of an ensemble of the senses of 
possible beings.
34
 
In order to constitute the world from inside, Merleau-Ponty takes from Husserl the 
transcendental world, i.e. semantic possibilities for nature. Thus, Merleau-Ponty considers nature 
a field of semantic possibilities. In his last works, Merleau-Ponty’s approach starts from a 
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perceptual faith, from the Lebenswelt. As Duportail says, the lifeworld is intrinsically linked to 
the expressive operation.
35
 Lifeworld becomes part of ontological and semantic genres.
36
 To 
return to the things themselves means to understand the ‘meaning’ of to be in the lifeworld. What 
is the relation of ‘world’ to language? To return to the lifeworld means, for Merleau-Ponty, to 
return to the speech of the world, the expression of the world.
37
 If we look from the opposite 
direction, the silent experience of the world is always already expressive. The meaning of 
experience already lies in the silent experience of the world:
38
  
The task of language is similar [to painting]. Given an experience, which may be banal 
but for the writer captures a particular savor of life, given, in addition, words, forms, 
phrasing, syntax, even literary genres, modes of narrative that, through custom, are 
already endowed with a common meaning – the writer’s task is to choose, assemble, 
wield, and torment these instruments in such a way that they induce the same sentiment 
of life that dwells in the writer at every moment, deployed henceforth in an imaginary 
world and in the transparent body of language. There is, then, on both sides, [painting and 
language] the same transmutation, the same migration of a meaning scattered in the 
experience that leaves the flesh in which it did not manage to collect itself, mobilizes 
already capitalized instruments for its own profit, and employs them so that in the end 
they become the very body it had needed while in the process of acquiring the dignity of 
expressed meaning.
39
  
 
The world is already expressive in itself. We can conclude that the transmutation of the meaning 
of the world in cultural meanings is possible. But this metamorphosis of meanings is a priori 
doomed to failure.
40
 The creation of significance in language implies a distortion of the symbolic 
instruments available to the speaker:
41
 
The speech, as distinct from language, is this moment where the intention of meaning, 
still silent and in action, proves itself to incorporate in my culture and as well in the other 
culture, also it constitutes both, me and the other, transforming [thus] the meaning of 
cultural instruments. In turn, the speech becomes available because it gives us afterwards 
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the illusion that the speech was contained in the significations already available, whereas, 
by a sort of trick, the speech attaches itself only to infuse a new life.
42
 
 
The expression of the world refers to an infinite lack, which cannot be filled or satisfied, and that 
will haunt consciousness.  
Meanings emerge from the world, but essentially they are incomplete and create a state of 
permanent (unconscious) dissatisfaction. Merleau-Ponty’s collocation speaking-speech cannot 
answer to the call of the silent life unless, perhaps, there is an intertwining of expressive acts 
with each other, in the same chain of repetition, opened ad infinitum.
43
 In his Themes from the 
Lecture at the Collége du France, Merleau-Ponty raises the concept of ‘institution of 
expression’: 
We understand through institution these events of an experience that endow it with 
sustainable dimensions through which a whole series of other experiences will make 
sense, forming a thinkable suite (series) or history – or, again, these events that deposit in 
me a meaning, are not about survival or rest, but as we will say, requirements for the 
future.
44
 
 
According to Duportail, the logic of expressive acts places itself in a history, starting from a 
founding event.
45
 Only through this foundational act may we understand speech. For instance, 
the founding event of painting is, according to Merleau-Ponty, the pre-historic cave wall 
paintings. These images constitute the tradition of painting that still requires, today, a future, or 
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as Merleau-Ponty says, “un champ de recherches illimité.”46 These pictures create the institution 
of a world of painting through which we make the world speak through us.
47
  
 
Thinking through the founding event, Merleau-Ponty tries to grasp the conception of the 
first utterance. The first utterance is, according to him, chiasmatic. To be more specific, the first 
utterance is the effect of the body’s experience in the world, a corporeal exchange: “Only when 
the painter lends his own body to the world, then he changes the world in the painting.”48 Or, as 
Duportail states, paraphrasing Merleau-Ponty: “The world speaks to us and we listen and reply to 
it, in silence, with our body.”49 With this first moment the history of the perceived world is 
created. At the same time, the world is a cultural “realm”, a diacritical world.50 The historicity of 
perceived meaning and of the perceived world is embodied. My body is the Stiftung (foundation) 
of the lifeworld,
51
 or, as the author of The Visible and the Invisible writes: “My body is to the 
greatest extent what every thing is: a dimensional this [en ceci dimensionnel]. It is the universal 
thing –. But, while the things become dimensions only insofar as they are received in a field, my 
body is the field itself, i.e. a sensible that is dimensional of itself, universal measurant 
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[measuring].”52 My body can be understood as the topology of meaning, because it is the place 
where the immanent meanings of the world are hidden and from where they come to ‘light’.  
Merleau-Ponty’s theory is not a form of intellectualism, which analyses perception as a 
thinking process. He is looking to give perception its initial meaning, that is, as opening 
(Offenheit) and an introduction to the world (our insertion into nature, into an animated body). 
Merleau-Ponty activates a regression to reach the body as the native expression that constitutes, 
for the first time, the “operant language.”53 Merleau-Ponty asserts, in his last work, “Philosophy 
would have to plunge into the world instead of surveying it.”54 In other words, before any 
reflection on the world, we are already plunged into the world with our bodies. The body is the 
first institution in the world in that it alone can perceive the silent meaning of the world and also 
‘mediate’ between logos endiathetos (logos of the aesthetic world, interior) and logos 
prophorikos (logos of utterance, language or spirit). The body mediates between the world of 
silent things (logos of the sensible, logos of life) and the world of spoken things (the operant 
language). However, the body as a binder between these two worlds is a lived body and not a 
sort of mechanism. The body “is the intertwining of visions and movement, it is a seeing force 
that constitutes a system of systems, which acts as a span of distances, which designates in the 
inconceivable triviality of being hollows and reliefs, distances, deviations, a meaning.”55 
If we really want to understand the origin of meaning, Merleau-Ponty says in The Prose 
of the World, “we shall not understand any other creation or any other culture, for we shall fall 
back upon the supposition of an intelligible world in which everything is signified in advance – 
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we must give up every signification that is already institutionalized and return to the starting 
point of nonsignifying world.”56 Merleau-Ponty expects to find something that provokes the 
desire to signify (painters to paint, writers to write) somewhere inside the world or, more 
specifically, inside of our life. What is that thing that makes us act and to bring new meanings 
into the world? Lack may be the answer here, which relates, in Merleau-Ponty’s work, to 
foundation, Stiftung.
57
 The foundation of life is lack, an invisible meaning of the visible world. 
The meaning is not a subjective “product”; it is deposited in me in order to “attend” an event.   
The event represents the meeting of the world with the subject (artist, writer and painter) as a 
discovery of her creative reason. This event brings out – in art, in painting, in writing – a 
perceptual meaning able “to gather up a series of antecedent sedimented expressions in an 
eternity always ready to be remade.”58 Meaning reveals itself in an institutional world because of 
a Stiftung. The institution represents “these events of an experience that endow it with 
sustainable dimension through which a whole series of other experiences will make sense, 
forming a thinkable suite (series) or history.”59 This history is the history of the perceived. 
Variations on this history, Duportail affirms, represent the institution of the lifeworld. For 
instance, painting is a good example of an institution of the lifeworld:
60
 “there is a history of life 
[…] it is the one who lives in the painter when he works, when the painter unites in one gesture 
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the tradition that retakes him and founds him.”61 There is a continuity between the perceptive and 
the significative acts; in other words, the history of the lifeworld shows linguistic expression as 
the recovery of perceptual meaning. For instance, as Merleau-Ponty says, “Pictorial expression 
assumes and transcends the patterning of the world which begins in perception.”62 Duportail 
considers that perception in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking is already a distorted expression of the 
perceived, because the perception stylises the perceived.
63
 Thus, “the perceptual meaning is 
nothing other than the coherent deformation of the visible by the act of perception.”64  
The example, through which we can observe how perception stylizes the perceived, is 
given by Merleau-Ponty in the form of an example from Malraux: 
A woman passing by is not first and foremost a corporeal contour for me, a colored 
mannequin, a spectacle in a given spot. She is an individual, sentimental, sexual 
expression. She is a flesh in its full presence, with its vigor and weakness there in her 
walk or the click of her heel on the ground. She is a unique way of varying the accent of a 
feminine being and thus of a human being, which I understand the way I understand a 
sentence, namely because it finds in me the system of resonators that it needs.
65
 
 
The body, through its gestures, constitutes the pedestal of expression. The way in which the body 
moves already implements a meaning into the world. Hence, the alleged body shape that I see in 
the distance is nothing but a linguistic form that resonates with me.    
Genealogic inquiry moves back in time to those days when the body was the primordial 
form on cave paintings; when the body, as the first expression in the world, established the first 
operant language: “It is the expressive operation of the body, begun in the least perception, 
which amplifies into painting and art. The field of pictorial signification was opened the moment 
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a man appeared in the world. The first sketch on the walls of a cave founded a tradition only 
because it gleaned from another – the tradition of perception.”66 The body, as first perceived 
object in the world, creates a tradition of perception that is immortalized in works of art. In turn, 
the work of art builds a history of perception created by the body: “The quasi eternity of art 
compounds the quasi eternity of our corporeal existence. It is through our body that we have the 
first experience of the impalpable body of history prior to all initiation into art.”67 
In painting we can find a tradition of perception or style, originated in the body as first 
object perceived. Style is something that occurs between painter and world, between perceiving 
and perceived. The one who perceives is the one that stylized the perceived. In painting, style 
becomes visible only when the painter applies on canvas the perception and representation of an 
“intensity” of the world.68 Before any artistic expression, between the painter’s body and the 
world, in their eternal embodied existential relation, there is a presupposed meaning, an invisible 
“entity” that emerges stylized, later, on canvas.  
 My body brings to light the expression of the world. Consequently, my body, as a 
“seeing force” in the world, can be understood, on the one hand, as an articulation before 
perception, as an apparition of something where there was nothing. It can, on the other hand, be 
something that expresses freedom, history, and productivity, or, in other words, expresses the 
creation of meaning. My body in the world seems to be a hinge of the for itself and the for the 
other. In this respect, the body become an ontological currency that supports the reversible 
movement between perceiving and perceived, or the invisible and the visible.  
The dual significance of the body becomes the pivotal element in psychoanalysis, 
because it puts in balance the interior world (psychic) with the exterior world (the perceptual 
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reality). Freud’s concept of drive (Trieb) denotes a borderline concept between psyche and soma; 
it designates the energy sent to the psychic by a somatic impulse. Drive denotes, also, the 
relation of the body with an exterior object. The body is the hinge that allows drives to reach 
their purpose. This purpose is not defined by some sort of ultimate given that must be reached in 
order to be fully satisfied, but by an eternal return to an indefinite source of enjoyment that 
makes the drives have a circular path. Unlike the instinct, which defines the sexual life of 
animals, the drives differ from biological needs in that they can never be satisfied. The drives do 
not aim at an object and the goal is not to reach a final destination, but to follow its aim, which is 
to circle round the object. Drives may be conceived as cultural or linguistic constructs.  
As a first institution in the lifeworld, the body becomes, in the first place, an event 
circumscribed in the order of wild being, a “primitive” topos where world meanings are 
engraved. The body appears every day as shaped flesh, but it is not just a corporeal contour or a 
colored shape; it is a potential stylized linguistic form. 
 
The Body and its psychoanalytic implications  
 
In one sense, the intellectual meeting of psychoanalysis and phenomenology began when 
Freud introduced the concept of hysterical conversion
69
 and drives in the theory of the body. 
Working with hysterics, Freud came to understand the special sensitivity of the body in relation 
to unconscious representation.  
The relation psyche-body is a relation of two separated dimensions mediated by the 
unconscious. Therefore, Freud claims that repressed representations ‘speak in the body’. This 
latter aspect leads Freud to highlight a paradox regarding the body’s hysterical phenomena. The 
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hysteric suffers from nervous disorder that cannot be assimilated to any localized organic lesion, 
which why the hysteric behaves, for instance when he is paralysed, as if anatomy did not exist, or 
as if he had no knowledge of it. The symptom, in this case, is a coded message.  
To designate the transportation of libidinal energy and the inscription of ideas in the 
body, Freud appeals to the concept of hysterical conversion. The hysterical conversion is defined 
by the intensity of emotional crisis and diversity of somatic effects. The causes of hysteric 
symptoms are, according to Freud, psychic traumas. The hysteric suffers because of 
reminiscence. In other words, the affect has not discharged the energy of the cause, verbally or 
somatically: the mental representation of the trauma is absent, prohibited or unbearable. The 
defensive mechanism that helps form the hysteric symptom is a repression of mental 
representations that is incompatible with the Ego. What repression keeps away from the 
conscious represents the impulses that disturb and cause inconvenience. If the repression, as 
defensive mechanism, is not functional, then the impulses are diverted by other processes, 
typically neurosis. 
If the practical side of psychoanalysis, instituted by Freud, is enriched by a human 
component and unconditional clinical education, the theoretical side is mindful of a true 
naturalism; this proof that Freud has adhered to the materialist and the scientific movement of 
the end of 19
th
 Century. The interest of French philosophers in the Freudian clinic, at the 
beginning of the 1950s, facilitated the access to Freud’s terminology. 
 
In 1951, Merleau-Ponty, at a conference called L’home et l’adversité, affirmed:  
Our century has erased the dividing line between the body and the spirit and now human 
life is seen as corporeal and spiritual, through and through, always supporting the body, 
always interested, even in its most carnal modes, in relation with people. For many 
thinkers, at the end of the nineteenth century, the body was a piece of matter, a beam 
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mechanism. The twentieth century rehabilitates and deepens the concept of flesh, that is, 
the living body.
70
 
 
The osmotic relation between the anonymous life of the body and personal life, between the 
organism and our mundane life: the unconscious. Merleau-Ponty claims that the Freudian 
unconscious is a ‘protean’ notion with different meanings. At first glance, the unconscious 
denotes a topos which circumscribes a dynamic of the drives, a dynamic which cannot be 
known.
71
 The unconscious is not a third-person process. It is not in-itself a process, with 
meaning. The unconscious avoids ‘coherence’, and also avoids situations in which there is 
resistance; as Merleau-Ponty states, it “is not a non-knowledge but rather an unrecognized 
knowledge, unformulated, which we do not want to assume.”72  
Through the unconscious, Freud posits a close connection between the spiritual function 
of the body and the embodiment of the spirit. Accordingly, the interpersonal relationship is not 
an organic relation (between two Körper), but a relation between two living bodies (between two 
Lieb).
73
 The embodied subject shows the tautological system of projection and introjection, the 
chiasmatic relation between two incarnated subjects: 
In his late work he [Freud] speaks about aggressive sexual intercourse with the other as a 
fundamental given of our life. As the aggression does not refer to an object but to a 
person, the intertwining of the sexual and the aggressive means that sexuality has, so to 
speak, an interior, which is doubled, throughout its range, by a relationship from person 
to person. The sexual is our manner, fleshly, because we are flesh, to live our relationship 
with the other. Since sexuality represents the relation with the other, and not only with 
another body, it will weave between the other and me the circular system of projections 
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and introjections, bringing to light the indefinite series of reflecting reflections and 
reflected reflections, that means I am another and he is myself.
74
 
 
The body is an enigmatic thing; as Merleau-Ponty states, it is part of this world, but in a strange 
way, as it is led by an enigmatic desire that lives within. This desire aims to approach the other 
and to make it join in its body. 
Freud observes a sort of corporeal signal, in hysteria, that denotes that a repressed 
representation was ‘nestled’ in our body. Neurosis, for Freud, allows one to observe better the 
meeting between the biological body and the drives’ representative (signifiers). The drive 
representative belongs to the order of language, in other words, to the symbolic order. The 
symptom, in this case, indicates a message ignored by the hysteric. The message has a 
metaphorical value and it appears “written in symbols on the body” (the classic symptomatology 
of hysteria involves physical symptoms such as local paralyses, pains and anaesthesia for which 
no organic cause can be found). The subject suffers a constitutive trauma (constituted by 
language). Stated otherwise, the causative event of the emotive condition of the neurotic was not 
released verbally because the psychic trauma (symbolic representation) was prohibited or 
unbearable. Ultimately, the subject, as speaking being, does not have direct access to her object 
of desire (to the original cause of the trauma); the subject is, thereby, engaged in demand and is 
compelled to jouir through language.     
Merleau-Ponty understood that the idea of symbol was a great discovery of 
psychoanalysis. Thus, in his conversation with George Charbonier, Merleau-Ponty attributes to 
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Freud the merit for reaffirming the term ‘symbol’, which, before, was a significantly faded 
concept.
75
 According to Merleau-Ponty, “a symbol is an emblem, it is more than a sign;” he adds 
“it is the very opposite of the sign.”76 A symptom, like other unconscious formations, e.g. the 
dream, the Freudian slip, misreading, mishearing and temporary forgetting, receives the symbol 
of sexual status. Furthermore, every worldly existence expresses the libido: “Literally, the 
Freudian symbolism appears at the beginning as a relation that exists between all of what we see, 
live, think […] and sexual life. Everything is, in this narrow sense, symbol of sexuality.”77  
According to Duportail, psychoanalysis finds common ground with phenomenology in 
introducing sexuality into the thinking of the symbolism of the world.
78
 One of the concepts 
accepted by both psychoanalysis and phenomenology is the concept of narcissism. Firstly, 
narcissism indicates a stage of subjective development and it is an effect of this development. 
The child, in his development, will discover his own body as an erotic object. This form of 
narcissism, called autoerotism, will be followed, necessarily, by a second form of narcissism.  
The child will externalize his sexual drives towards the image of his body (in the mirror) and he 
will assume the new object-body as his own body. In other words, the sexual drives take the 
exterior body as the object through which they (the drives) can find satisfaction. From this very 
moment the child invests his sexuality in his own body. This new form of narcissism starts when 
the libido manifests attaches to external objects. Based on the mirror identification, the 
imaginary identifications of the Ego appear. Nonetheless, the mirror image is the external 
representation of the body and for this reason the I is an-other.  
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Narcissism, when used as an ontological term, refers to both, the seer and the visible. We 
can find in every vision the identity seer – visible, because the seer, being caught in what he sees, 
is still himself who sees; thereby there is a fundamental narcissism in all vision.
79
 Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology, mediates between ‘classic phenomenology’ and psychoanalysis, and so 
rediscovers the Freudian meaning of the libido. For Merleau-Ponty there is nothing that is not 
sexual.
80
  
 
The mirror stage in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking 
 
The theory of the mirror stage in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is close to the 
psychoanalytical view, especially that of Lacan’s theory. In 1951, Merleau-Ponty lectured at the 
Sorbonne and published these lectures as The Child’s Relations with Others. In this course he 
analyses the phenomenon of the mirror stage in order to explain the social behaviour of the child. 
Merleau-Ponty treats two theories regarding this phenomenon: Henri Wallon’s and Jacques 
Lacan’s. Both have the body as a starting point.  
The body is the first element that a child can identify in relation with the other. 
According to Wallon, the recognition of the other’s specular image is more precocious than the 
child’s recognition of her own specular image. The same is true of the image and the reality of 
the other.
81
 But this recognition cannot be a recognition in the true meaning of the word. For 
instance, the child experiences the specular image of her father and this image cannot be 
distinguished from the father`s real body, even if both images appear at the same time in 
                                                          
79
 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, pp. 134-139.  
80
 Merleau-Ponty, Notes de Cours, 1959-1961 (Paris, NFR, Gallimard) p.150-151.  
81
 Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology and Pedagogy The Sorbonne Lecture 1949-1952 (Northwestern University 
Press, Evanston, Illinois 2010), p. 250. 
36 | P a g e  
 
different places.
82
 In other words, before the mirror stage, the child takes as real any image 
around, because she experiences spatiality in such a way that she attributes reality to all images. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, at this stage, all images are quasi-realities or phantoms.
83
 This is 
the first stage, in which the child thinks the images have their own independent existence.
84
 At 
the next stage, the child faces a dilemma. She has two visual images of her father: father and 
father’s specular image. Moreover, children have only one complete image of their own body: 
the mirror image. According to Wallon, the child must understand that the image is not her 
because she is “where he interoceptively senses herself when she sees her image in the mirror.”85 
The Wallon solution is provided by the development of the child’s intelligence; thus the child 
has to learn that the specular image is not real. 
However, Wallon’s theory is not complete, according to Merleau-Ponty. Lacan’s point of 
view provides a phenomenological solution rather than an intellectual one. Merleau-Ponty asserts 
that Wallon’s intellectual point of view does not answer why the child is interested in her 
specular image or why the child finds this experience so amusing.
86
 When children identify with 
the specular image they do not face only their own ego
87
 but also a spectacle.
88
 Before the mirror 
stage, on the Lacanian psychoanalytical view, the child is at the id stage. Through the mirror 
stage, the child experiences her self-image as an alienated body and this will make the 
constitution of the ego possible. According to Merleau-Ponty, this stage is not at all an 
acquisition of a new content, but an acquisition of a new function, “a self-contemplation, a 
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narcissistic attitude taking on a cardinal importance.”89 Thus, the identification with the specular 
image makes the child leave her lived reality. Henceforth, the child will refer, constantly, to her 
ideal, fictive or imaginary I, whose specular image is her first draft, her first symbol, of her 
corporality. Now, the child is able to be sensitive to others and to consider herself a fellow being 
among other humans. The child is tied to its immediate reality. Her reality is captured by her ego, 
which the child finds to be the first symbol of the specular image. Now the image prepares me 
for another alienation, “the other’s alienation of me.”90 Thus, the child will put herself in relation 
to the other as the other: “I have an exterior aspect; I am visible for the other. The other has a 
view of me. The relation with the other has the value of a real structure; it is a system of 
relations at the interior of my experience.”91 This experience, once again, is given by a visual 
perception. For psychoanalysis, the visual is not only a sense feature but it has the significance of 
spectacle, or the imaginary. The narcissistic function represents the matrix of all intersubjective 
relationships and also institutes verbal communication.  
The difference between Wallon and psychoanalysis, says Merleau-Ponty, is that 
psychoanalysis accentuates the affective essence of the phenomenon, whereas for Wallon it is an 
issue of the work of consciousness.
92
 Merleau-Ponty asserts further:  
For psychoanalysts, the visual is not only a sense mode; it has an entire different 
significance. The visual is the sense of spectacle, the imaginary. It is where the 
integration of different sensations becomes a way of relating to self and even to the other. 
At the same time, psychoanalysis places an accent on anticipation and the always 
possible regression. The child defines himself by a kind of anticipation taken by the 
subject on his current resources. Birth is characterised by pre-maturation: the first 
Oedipal drive is a sort of puberty or psychological puberty. The child lives in the future, 
but only the adult can regress. Childhood is never fully realized. We continue to see, by a 
kind of magical belief, a double of ourselves in the image.
93
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The child’s image in the mirror is not a constitutive image until the Other ratifies the image as 
the image of the child. The mirror stage is the moment when the child moves from a primitive 
form of language (screams, laughter, etc.) to language itself (the child becomes aware of his 
body). This is a progression from need to desire. In the stage of need the child lives in the future; 
after, living in ‘demand’, as an effect of desire, the young man can regress; he has a past, 
memories.  
The mirror stage as narcissistic function is related, by Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and 
the Invisible, to the concepts of chiasm and reversibility. Vision can be understood in two ways, 
referring to seeing (the one who sees and is invisible) and being seen (to be visible). In all vision 
there is an identity between the seer and the visible:
94
 “Since the seer is caught up in what he 
sees it is still himself he sees: there is a fundamental narcissism of all vision.”95 The person who 
looks is not external to the world that he looks at: both vision and the world are part of the flesh. 
Flesh is the principle that puts seer and vision into relation with each other. Thus, “as soon as I 
see, it is necessary that the vision be doubled with a complementary vision or with another 
vision: myself seen from without, such as another would see me, installed in the mist of the 
visible…”96 The narcissistic desire of the person who sees explains that he sees only because he 
needs to be seen by the other, to be visible to the other:  
Thus since the seer is caught up in what he sees, it is himself he sees: there is a 
fundamental narcissism of all vision. And thus, for the same reason, the vision he 
exercises, he also undergoes from the things, such that, as many painters have said, I feel 
myself looked at by the things, my activity is equally passivity – which is the second and 
more profound sense of narcissism: not to see in the outside, as the others see it, the 
contour of the body one inhabits, but especially to be seen by the outside, to exist within 
it, to emigrate into it, to be seduced, captivated, alienated by the phantom, so that the seer 
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and the visible reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees and which is 
seen.
97
 
 
This reversible ‘movement’ of perception, which is doubled by a counter-perception, is the sine 
qua non condition for Merleau-Ponty in explaining the function of the flesh; as Merleau-Ponty 
says, the flesh is a mirror phenomenon. The mirror helps me to create the image of my body; the 
mirror is “an extension of my relation with my body.”98 Therefore, the flesh constitutes these 
intersections of “fields” – between me and the other, between me and the sensible world, etc. – 
where subjectivities are integrated. This structure of intersection exists in one sole ‘element’, 
namely, the flesh of the world. Thus, the world is doubled by these coupled concepts: the world 
is outside and inside in reciprocity, the world is phenomenal and objective, in brief, the world is 
chiasmatic. This reciprocity reveals Merleau-Ponty’s idea of transcendence, “that is, of the world 
seen within inherence in this world, by virtue of it, of an Intra ontology…”99 In this way, 
Merleau-Ponty tries to think our opening towards Being as a relationship with the Being that has 
place inside the flesh of the world. Intra-ontology denotes a relationship with Being which takes 
place within Being.
100
 
Merleau-Ponty does not try to overcome the dualism between seeing and to be seen. He 
internalises it, bringing it into the world, making the dualism “live” in the visible. But what is the 
visible in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking? The visible is nothing else than “this generality of the 
sensible in itself, this anonymity innate to Myself that we have previously called flesh.”101 Flesh 
represents the dehiscence of being: “the flesh is the tissue common to the seeing body and the 
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visible world, thought as inseparable, nascent to one another, one for the other, a dehiscence.”102 
Flesh is an ontological element, “in the sense of general thing, midway between the spatio-
temporal individual and the idea.”103  
The flesh becomes “the mirror phenomenon and the mirror is an extension of my relation 
with my body.”104 The flesh an intermediary, an included middle between I and my “shadow”. 
The flesh creates the Bild of the thing, the Wesen in a verbal sense.
105
 Bringing together Merleau-
Ponty’s theory of the specular image and Lacan’s mirror stage, I could say that the flesh is the 
ontological element that splits in order to institute language. Creating this écart between me and 
the other, the world becomes visible or becomes a world of language, a diacritical world:  
To touch oneself, to see oneself, is to obtain such a specular extract of oneself. i.e. fission 
of appearance and Being – a fission that already takes in the touch (duality of the 
touching and the touched) and which, with the mirror (Narcissus) is only a more 
profound adhesion to Self. The visual projection of the world in me to be understood not 
as intra-objective things-my body relation [.], but as a shadow-body relation, a 
community of Verbal Wesen and hence finally a “resemblance” phenomenon, 
transcendence.
106
 
 
Narcissism passes from the field of psychoanalysis to the field of ontology. Merleau-Ponty 
introduces narcissism into the theory of flesh and reversibility. Everything happens as if the 
visible arises at the moment when a certain visible focuses and collects for itself its own visible, 
which is dispersed first into the world. In the same way the child is born as a self – in the sense 
of a person – at the moment in which the child recognises her image in the mirror, assuming a 
visibility that passes through others and through the world, returning on herself.
107
 Vision is 
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narcissistic inasmuch as the body must be visible and visible for itself. Thereby, the child is its 
own narcissistic object. 
In the end, mirroring is not complete, because every time something is lost. In touch, for 
example, when the right hand is touching the left hand, the left hand is not merely touched, since, 
in reverse, the left hand is touching the right hand. I can never have the experience of one hand 
as the realised touching-touched. We should understand the chiasm between seeing and being 
seen in the same way. The mirror image of one who looks in the mirror is not a complete image. 
The child’s image in the mirror is a self-alienation. When the child recognises his body in the 
mirror, the child finds himself the object of his desire. Freud calls this object das Ding. The 
object is lost in the moment in which it is constituted through language. The mirror stage is the 
moment of a permanent loss. Primordial loss creates a permanent need to recoup the negated or 
lost. 
The object (das Ding) cannot be substituted. The object is the object and cause of desire. 
According to Lacan, the object is l’Objet petit a. The mirror stage shows that the constitution of 
language and of Ego is the product of a gap that allows the subject to be alienated from himself. 
  
The mirror stage in Lacan’s thinking 
 
In his paper on the mirror stage, Lacan speaks about the formation of the body image as a 
totality and as the birth of the ego. The mirror stage (or the looking-glass phase) was described 
for the first time by a friend of Lacan, Henri Wallon, in 1931, although Lacan attributes its 
discovery to James Mark Baldwin.
108
 The mirror test, attributed to Wallon, is a particular 
experiment which differentiates the human infant from the chimpanzee. The six month old child 
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differs from the chimpanzee of the same age in that the former becomes fascinated with its 
reflection in the mirror and assumes it as its own image, whereas the chimpanzee loses interest in 
its image in the mirror. Unlike the mirror test, Lacan’s mirror stage represents a fundamental 
aspect of the structure of subjectivity.
109
 This is the moment in which the child is permanently 
caught and captivated by her own image.  According to Lacan, at between six and eight months 
of age, the infant forms her ego via the process of identification; the ego is the result of 
anticipated identification with one’s own specular image.110 Lacan notes, in The Mirror Stage, 
that: 
This act, far from exhausting itself, as in the case of monkey, once the image has been 
mastered and found empty, immediately rebounds in the case of the child in the series of 
gestures in which he experiences in play relation between the movements assumed in the 
image and the reflected environment, and between this virtual complex and the reality it 
reduplicates – the child’s own body, and the person and things, around him.111 
 
The recognition of the child in the mirror should be understood as an imaginary identification, as 
a transformation of the subject when he assumes the image. This aspect is circumscribed in a 
homeomorphic identification order. The child is exposed to an exclusively visual action, 
provided it by others. The specular image, which gives the child the intuitive form of its body, 
institutes a relation between the child’s body and the environment. The environment, as an 
exterior ‘object’, relates to a fashioning activity of the child. Thus, the environment receives only 
the form of the subjective. The child “destroys” the independence of the object at the moment in 
which the ego is realized in the mirror. The other is just an image, and so the child does not attain 
any existence in the object because he stylises the exterior. 
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In order to recognise herself in the mirror, the child stylises the object, but this 
presupposes a movement from I am to I have. Desire pushes me to possess the exterior.
112
 From I 
am to I have may be expressed in philosophical terms as a movement from inner world as 
imaginary dimension of the ‘I’ (Innenwelt) to environmental world as physical world 
(Unwelt).
113
 We can find the same idea in Phenomenology of Spirit:  
… the objective I acquires the determination of another I, and hence arises the 
relationship of one self-consciousness to another self-consciousness, and between these 
two the process of recognition. Here, self-consciousness is no longer merely individual 
self-consciousness, but in it there already begins a unification of individuality and 
universality.
114
 
 
My desire faces the other. The image of the other can lure me in, show me the challenges of the 
other Ego.  
The mirror stage is also closely related to narcissism: Narcissus falls in love with his own 
reflection. Narcissism indicates death, a vital insufficiency. The insufficiency is identification 
with oneself. This moment of narcissism is the period when the ego is constituted in the mirror. 
Narcissism is operative now, when previously the ego did not exist. The child “falls into the 
world”. The child identifies herself only through the imaginary order. As Lacan would say, the 
other has the object of my desire. What is this object? The object is me or, in this case, the child. 
The child is his own object, but he can aspire to this object only through the other.  
In Lacan’s theory, identification is complete only when the child interiorizes the specular 
image, and this process needs help from the Other. The Other, in this case, is the mother that 
helps the child to recognize herself. The mother tells her child that the image from the mirror is 
himself. She makes the transition from you are to I am, from the imaginary (the realm of the 
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Ego) to the symbolic (the realm of the subject). I am represents the very first “utterance” of the 
child after the mother ratifies his or her image in the mirror. Her body, as I am, becomes the first 
symbol. As Merleau-Ponty would say, the body is cut out from the flesh of the world and now is 
a part of the cultural world.  
 In the same essay, The Mirror Stage, we can observe the gearing of the three registers: 
the real, the imaginary and the symbolic. The body image is a result of the conjunction between 
the real body, as organic body, and the image of the Other. In terms of the real body, Lacan 
asserts it has at least three connotations: it is impossible, it opposes resistance, and it is the object 
of rejection. The real body is constituted by all things that escape attempts to be symbolized and 
imagined; for that reason, the concept real denotes impossible. Resistance of the real body refers 
to a real element we face every day, which returns always in the same place and which imposes 
an obstacle to our will and desire. For instance, we circumscribe under the concept of real body 
the anatomical difference of the sexes and death as the inevitable destruction of soma. In terms 
of rejection, the real body constitutes the object that can be rejected by the child. For instance, 
Lacan argues, a child can reject the anatomical difference of sexes between himself and his 
mother. 
Now, in terms of the symbolic body, Lacan has introduced the term body of signifiers in 
his seminar on psychosis.
115
 He used the concept of body of signifiers to designate all signifiers: 
conscious signifiers, repressed signifiers and repudiated (foreclosed) signifiers. These are the 
signifiers of the subject. The body of signifiers designates, also, the way in which signifiers 
organize themselves. All these elements that constitute the body of signifiers and the subject of 
the unconscious (linguistic elements like words, syllables, phonemes, and letters) may have been 
spoken and thought before childbirth. First of all, these signifiers denote the child’s identity (first 
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name, last name, the child’s birthplace, her race, the social environment etc.). To this heritage 
(that the child acquires before birth) will be added a constellation of signifiers; such a 
constellation brings in the unconscious and the conscious, desire of Others (represented, in this 
case, by the parents, les Autres parentaux). Through these signifiers the child gains her symbolic 
alienation. In other words, the child will recognize her own image in the mirror and she will 
internalize this image with help from the Other. After the child recognized herself in the mirror, 
the child needs someone to ratify the specular image. This person is the mother. 
In psychoanalytical literature the body is also called a book of flesh, where signifiers of 
demand are registered. In other words, the body is the place where the signifiers of desire of the 
Other endure. Consider, for instance, the conscious and unconscious desire of parents regarding 
their children: my child should be a doctor, my child must play football, my boy must have long 
hair, my daughter must have straight teeth, my daughter should be a boy because she behaves 
like a boy, etc. Any of these signifiers can change the child’s behaviour. Correlatively, Lacan 
asserts that the body speaks: “Through his own body the subject utters a word which, as such, is 
the word of truth, a word which he (the subject) does not know he releases as signifier. In this 
way the subject always tells more than he means.”116 Any gesture or movement of the body, 
represents a signifier. The signifiers are encrypted in the body and exhibited by gestures. 
Therefore, the body ‘speaks’ and the subject is not aware of this form of utterance, because the 
signifier is an autonomous element of discourse. The signifier is that linguistic element that 
represents and determines the subject.  
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The symbolic body appears also as an “existent” in every nomination, independent of the 
presence of the organic body. Thus, the symbolic body can manifest its “existence” before its 
physical birth and after its complete extinction as biological entity. Mortuary rituals and all that 
relates to the memory of the dead are testimonials of this special existence of the symbolic body.  
Ultimately, we can see a very close relationship between three registers. We cannot 
function only in one register (for instance, in the pure symbolic order), independent of any other 
significance. This is especially true when this signification is repressed and, moreover, when it 
bears a desire. The symbol acquires its full value as ‘language’. Language separates parlêtre 
(speaking being) from the immediate thing (object). Language is, at the same time, something 
that makes the object subsist beyond its transformation or physical disappearance. Therefore, 
language is the constituent of life; the platform that organizes reality and, moreover, is the only 
way to access both reality and the other. If the world is seen by Lacan as a structure organised by 
language, which in turn regulates the social laws of exchange – as a symbolic pact – then the 
body becomes the fundamental institution of the world. Now, to some extent, I can affirm about 
body what Merleau-Ponty states on nature: “Body [Nature] is at the first day… The sensible, 
body [Nature], transcend the past present distinction, realise from within a passage from one into 
the other. Existential eternity. The indestructible, the barbaric Principle. Do a psychoanalysis of 
the Body [Nature]: it is the flesh, the mother.”117 
The analysis of the body, as part of a psychoanalysis of Nature, includes the body as 
phenomenon and the body as expression. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the speaking body lies 
between the soul and the body and holds a symbolic dimension. The symbolic dimension of the 
body includes the body’s intentionality.  
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The next chapters will reveal the meaning of interrogation as a new method. It claims to 
be the instrument of the philosopher and the psychoanalyst, by which they attempt to bring light 
to the ‘symptom of this world’. 
 
 
 
The Concept of Nature in Merleau-Ponty’s Thinking 
 
Beginning with Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty defines nature in relation 
to body and spirit. Nature designates that which links human being with the “given”, or with 
passivity.
1
 Nature is the foundation (Stiftung) which supports existence, the background for 
human life. Nature, as background, defines a dimension where Being is not separable from spirit, 
history or culture. As part of nature, the body is our medium for having a world.
2
 Things do not 
form the medium of experience, Merleau-Ponty holds; the body suffers modifications. The 
‘experience’ of the thing “exists primarily in its self-evidence.”3  As Merleau-Ponty writes in 
Phenomenology of Perception: “What is given is not the thing on its own, but the experience of 
the thing, or something transcendent standing in the wake of one’s subjectivity, some kind of 
natural entity of which a glimpse is afforded through a personal history.”4 Merleau-Ponty 
describes experience here as an ‘interior creative process of nature,’ a nature that opens a space 
of freedom for us, which allow us to perceive things by living them: “in order to perceive things, 
we need to live them.”5 
Nature does not refer only to physical processes, things or animal life; it refers to 
everything that manifests itself as a living existence in the world. The relation between spirit and 
nature is one of reciprocal foundation, an articulation between passive and active principles. 
Nature designates the passive existence of every being as it appears at birth. The spirit denotes 
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the active principle, the existence and freedom that, constantly, invents and reinvents itself. The 
articulation of nature and spirit shows a mutual envelopment, as the notion of Fundierung 
(mutual foundation) denotes in phenomenology.
6
 The entrance into the enigmatic world passes 
through spirit, which is embodied into nature. 
Merleau-Ponty’s perspective on nature and spirit will bring forward the idea of 
Naturphilosophie in his courses from the Collège de France 1956-1960. The philosopher 
maintains the mutual relationship between nature and spirit but the entrance into the world is 
nature. Nature is “the entity” that has its own meaning and this meaning is not placed there (in 
nature) by thinking. In the Introduction to La Nature (1956-1957) Merleau-Ponty states that:  
We are investigating primordial non-lexical meaning, still seen by people who speak of 
“Nature”. In Greek the word “Nature” is derived from the verb ϕύω, referring to the 
vegetal; from the Latin word nascor, to be born, live; it is deduced from the first 
meaning, which is fundamental. There is nature everywhere there is life that has a 
meaning, but where, however, there is no thinking; there is the relationship with the 
vegetal: it is nature that makes sense, without this sense being established by thinking. It 
is the auto-production of meaning. Nature is, therefore, different from a simple thing; it is 
an interior, it determines itself from within; from here comes the opposition of natural 
and accidental. And yet, Nature is different from the human; it is not instituted by the 
human, it is opposed to custom, to discourse.
7
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The main idea of Naturphilosophie, which Merleau-Ponty borrows from Schelling, is that nature 
is a barbaric principle; nature is above all reflections on being and any other things in general. 
Nature must be conceived as before any being, because nature is already there as the oldest 
element; a productive and perpetual principle. 
 Another important influence of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie is the redefinition of 
nothingness. According to Merleau-Ponty the notion of nothingness involves two aspects. On the 
one hand, Schelling starts from nature as pre-objective foundation of every being in the world 
and, as such, an absolute Being, without exterior.
8
 Thereby, there is no nothingness next to 
Being; thus, Being cannot be defined in opposition with nothingness.
9
 On the other hand, the 
existence of nature implicates a certain negativity, namely, nature is, at the same time, active and 
passive. Nature contains in itself a double movement: expansion and contraction. This duplicity 
shows that nature is self-differentiation and is opposed to itself; its infinite productivity manifests 
in individual forms. Furthermore, the negative that operates in nature is not suppressed by a 
superior synthesis. There is no dialectical result. Negativity is irreducible to nature.
10
 According 
to Merleau-Ponty, nothingness is the absolute non-being; to perceive nothing means that one is 
not able to perceive. There is this possibility of not seeing, of not thinking; the spirit, which 
always is thinking, stops. The spirit dies, but the meaning of death is not defined by the passage 
from existence to nothingness; death is different but not in opposition to life. These two notions, 
Merleau-Ponty states, are interlaced; one can fold over the other and become non-distinct. 
Therefore, existence (being) can be defined by the notion of indistinctness and not by the notion 
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of identity. Nothingness can be defined by the notion of distance or gap (écart) and not by the 
notion of otherness.  
For the later Merleau-Ponty, nature and spirit are mutual enveloped: neither is prior to the 
other.
11
 In The Visible and the Invisible he finds in nature the foundation for his new ontological 
psychoanalysis, or his psychoanalysis of nature;
12
 “Nature is at the first day” or, as he writes in 
La Nature:  
Nature is primordial, that is, the non-built and the non-instituted; from where comes the 
idea of an eternity of Nature (eternal return), of a solidity. Nature is an enigmatic object, 
an object that is not entirely an object; it is not entirely an object in front of us. It is our 
soil, not the one that is ahead, but the one that leads us.
13
  
 
Nature is everywhere where there is life and meaning. Nature has a meaning in itself. Nature is 
the auto production of its meaning. Before the formation of the ego, and so, before language, the 
human being is an integral part of nature with no distinction between ‘my body’ and nature. 
Before the mirror stage, the infant lives with the impression, somehow unconsciously, that every 
object is part of his body. The mystery of natural production remains an enigma. Before 
language, the human being lives in a sort of ‘intellectual intuition’; this, according to Merleau-
Ponty, is perception itself, before any link with language: Merleau-Ponty calls it the perception 
asleep in itself “where all things are me because I am not yet the subject of reflection.”14 And he 
adds: “At this level, the light and the air are not yet, as in Fichte, the medium of vision and 
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hearing, the medium for reasonable beings to communicate, but the symbols of native knowledge 
(Urwissen) and the eternal inscribed in Nature.”15 
 
The progressive form of Nature 
 
In The Visible and the Invisible working notes, Merleau-Ponty claims that “Nature is at the first 
day: it is there today”. He claims further that: “The sensible, Nature, transcend[s] the past present 
distinction, realizes from within a passage from one into the other.”16 Nature is “existential 
eternity, the indestructible and the barbaric principle.”17 All these latter appellations show that 
time has a close relationship with nature. Merleau-Ponty’s concern is to free the concept of time 
from philosophy of consciousness. Inspired by Freud’s idea of the unconscious and of the past as 
timeless, he eliminates the idea of time as a series of subjective experiences. Time is an opening 
that “contains in itself simultaneity;”18 it is a sort of passage that allows for the transference 
between the present and the past and vice versa. The past tense is a past that constitutes the 
temporal object of my subjectivity, a past as foundation (Stiftung): for example: the oak I saw in 
my childhood institutes within myself the concept of oak, hence, the real oak is the oak of the 
past that was present and remains present regardless of my subjectivity. Therefore, time is not 
anymore a series of experiences that involves the subjective meaning of the past and present, but 
the relation between past and present as a relation “from a noema to a noema.”19 There is a 
natural passage which connects the world, that is time as eternal existence (nunc stans), that 
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holds an intentional reference in itself which is not only from the past to the factual present, but 
also ‘in reverse’ from the factual present to a dimensional present or Welt or Being, where the 
past is simultaneous to the present.
20
  Time is the pulse of Nature, which crosses us, our spirit.
21
 
As I mentioned above, Merleau-Ponty’s goal was to break down the question of time exhibited 
by Husserl’s philosophy of consciousness. He states in The Visible and the Invisible:  
“The whole Husserlian analysis is blocked by the framework of acts which imposes upon 
it the philosophy of consciousness. It is necessary to take up again and develop the 
fungierende (operative) or latent intentionality which is the intentionality within being. 
That is not compatible with “phenomenology,” that is, with an ontology that obliges 
whatever is not nothing to present itself to the consciousness across Abschattungen 
(shadowing, sketches) and as deriving from an originating donation which is an act, i.e. 
one Erlebnis (experience, lived) among others.”22   
 
Thereby, consciousness and the flux of phenomena with all its intentional threads do not 
represent a primary philosophical conception. Time is, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, like a vortex, a 
schematized flux of phenomena, “the spatializing-temporalizing vortex,” which is flesh and not 
consciousness facing noema.
23
 
Nature is a cosmological principle, for Merleau-Ponty that gives birth to the world. 
Nature is a carnal principle, because it is the sensible. Merleau-Ponty, describes the flesh as the 
sensible in itself: “the old term element, in the sense it was used to speak of water, air, earth, and 
fire, that is, in the sense of a general thing, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of 
being wherever there is a fragment of being.”24 The identification of nature with the flesh is seen 
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in the already cited ground-statement: “Do a psychoanalysis of Nature: it is the flesh, the 
mother.”25  
If we want to find the origins of the English word ‘flesh’ we do not have to dig too far. 
The first dating of this word is around 1661, referring to the hue of Caucasian “skin”; in old 
English, flesh is understood as “meat” and in Old English poetry the word is used to mean 
“body.”26 The word ‘flesh’ is translated as ‘body’ in the first years of French phenomenology: 
chair is the usual translation for the German word Leib, the word used by Husserl in the Ideen II 
for the living body. Merleau-Ponty will use the concept of chair in the sense of Leib in his later 
work, where he states that chair is a living body.
27
 Before this, in Phenomenology of Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty translated Leib through the phenomenal body, the lived body and the body of the 
subject. At that time chair designated the body as object. In his later work flesh is put in relation 
to the opening of being; flesh is the tissue of the seeing body and the visible world, born one 
from another and one for the other.
28
 Flesh is the element that is situated between two (entre 
deux); flesh keeps together the components of the body (organs, bones, skin, blood vessels and 
nerves). Flesh keeps the body alive.  
If we are looking for an ancient Greek equivalent for the flesh, closer to Merleau-Ponty’s 
thinking, it is the word Khora. For Plato, nature (phýsis) is related with genesis: it is “the growth 
process or genesis.”29 Plato states, in Timaeus, that genesis takes place midway between true 
being and nonbeing.
30
 Plato calls this place hypodoche or khora, a sort of receptacle, space or 
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interval. Khora is the third kind of being,
31
 beside the unchangeable and invisible, and the visible 
and changeable.  
The flesh, according to Marc Richir, like Khora, is a sort of “bastard concept,” “half-way 
between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea,” to the very extent that it is the element of 
intersection, of chiasm, or, to speak like the Greeks, of the composite.
32
 The concept of flesh has 
a cosmological dimension, not in the sense of an eternal cosmic harmony, “but in the sense that 
the field of phenomena already constitutes a priori a certain arrangement, a wild cosmos, a 
nature, whatever these phenomena might be in other respects.”33 Merleau-Ponty does not have a 
theory of origins, “nor of a series of events going to a first cause, but one sole explosion of Being 
which is forever.”34 This “explosion” is the phenomenon itself, ‘phenomenalized’ by a sort of 
torsion or folding of the flesh onto itself.
35
 The world as cosmos is a phenomenological field 
rising on a horizon of invisibility or the non-phenomenal:
36
 “It is as if the essence, hidden in a 
hollow and constantly about to appear, occurs as a controlling principle of the phenomenon, but 
a principle which is always anticipated and never seen coinciding with or being transparent in the 
phenomenon itself.”37 Richir calls this ‘phenomenalization’ a distortion of the phenomenon: 
…every phenomenon is affected by an originating distortion by virtue of which, on the 
one hand,  there is only a phenomenon for another phenomenon, therefore for a sensation 
or a embodied vision, by necessity transferred in parts to the register of the sensible or the 
vision, so that the vision or the sensation of the phenomenon in that sense forms part of 
the phenomenon itself; on the other hand,  and correlatively, by virtue of this the 
phenomenon appears, and is by necessity phenomenalized as incompleted and this very 
incompletion as hinting at the imminence of the illusion of a completion. This is 
incessantly deferred insofar as the completion, the phenomenalization, of the non-
phenomenal (the invisible) that there is in it, in its horizons, will always only lead once 
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again to the phenomenon which is itself incomplete. It is by virtue of this originary 
distortion, which Merleau-Ponty calls a “good error,” that the phenomenon is contained 
within itself, that is to say it is phenomenalized.
38
  
 
The perception acts only in the phenomenon (in the visible or the perceptible); the non-
phenomenal side of the phenomenal is constitutive of perception itself (seeing, perceiving). 
There is a reversibility and enjambment, or chiasm, of all these terms, which we only 
differentiate in reflection.
39
 The phenomenon is not complete, but it offers, to the naked eye, the 
illusion of completion, because of language. Language “is a power for error, since it cuts the 
continuous tissue that joins us vitally to the things and to the past and is installed between 
ourselves and that tissue like a screen.”40  Language governs our life, as Merleau-Ponty states, 
“language is a life, is our life and the life of the things.”41 Life is structured by language. Vision 
itself, thought itself, are structured as language.
42
 This language lives only from silence. 
Language brings to the surface, from the anamorphic stage of silence, our lived experience; this 
is what Merleau-Ponty calls the “language of life and of action, of literature and of poetry.”43      
The theory of the flesh does not allow us to think Merleau-Ponty’s ontology as an 
eschatological ontology, nor as a cosmological one. In Merleau-Ponty’s thinking beginning and 
ending fold back on each other: “they have never been apart.”44 Nature remains a sort of 
potentiality principle of this world. It is a continuous presence, yet with past and future, but not 
beginning or ending. 
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The unconscious, libidinal body, desire and the tissue of the world 
 
In 1951, Merleau-Ponty participated in a conference, called The human and adversity,
45
 
where he argued that our century, the 20
th
, had erased the border between the body and spirit. 
Until this moment, the body was a piece of matter, a sort of mechanism. The 20
th
 century 
restored the notion of the body in the sense of an animate body (Leib). Human life is supported 
by the body. Life, in its carnal mode, is oriented to inter-personal relationship.
46
 To prove his 
point, Merleau-Ponty follows the notion of Leib (lived body) in Freud’s theory of 
psychoanalysis. Freud supports his theory with the concept of instinct. The notion of instinct is 
an “apparatus” inside of the body, which ensures a minimal movement or provides tailored 
responses to specific situations.
47
 Instinct cannot denote the way in which the infant develops 
love towards her parents. The infant’s relation with the other is mediated by her body, in other 
words, by the different areas and functions of the body, which are not capable of discrimination 
and articulated actions (a mouth that cannot distinguish between sucking and biting e.g.).
48
 
Accordingly, the relation with the other remains trapped in a sort of ‘difficulty’ expressed by the 
body’s unmediated relation with the other. The body remains an enigma abandoning itself to a 
peculiar desire to lure the other and to rejoin its body. The body is animated and animating, a 
natural appearance of the spirit.
49
 Psychoanalysis, Merleau-Ponty states, brings together spirit 
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and body: spirit passes into body and body passes into spirit.
50
 The psychoanalytic concept that 
links body and spirit is the unconscious. 
A first meaning of the unconscious, in Freud’s work, is the topos of the basic impulses 
which operate according to “the pleasure principle”. However, as a distinct ‘element’ of the 
psychic system, the unconscious cannot be described as a separate process: the unconscious is 
part of the psychic system alongside the conscious and preconscious. According to Merleau-
Ponty, the unconscious does not oppose the conscious: in fact, it dominates ‘psychic life’. The 
unconscious will shape the entrance of our conscious life; it will elude all the thoughts or 
situations that represent resistance, trying to satisfy its libido. The unconscious is not non-
knowledge, but, Merleau-Ponty states, it is unrecognised knowledge, which we do not want to 
assume.
51
 However, the author of Phenomenology of Perception proposes an emendation of the 
Freudian concept of the unconscious. Because it is inseparable from the desire of the body, the 
unconscious becomes a universal power of incarnation. 
52
 The body, which is entirely sensual, is 
a desiring body. The unconscious is the sense itself: the sense is not an intellectual possession of 
what is felt, but a dispossession of ourselves: openness to something that we do not have to think 
in order to recognize.
53
  
I have argued, in chapter one, that desire is an auto-affection of the sensing body, a desire 
for oneself. To be more precise, through desire we try to recuperate what we have lost by self-
alienation in the visible world (the voice, feces, mother’s breast, the look and the phallus). The 
specular body (as visible body) represents, for Merleau-Ponty, an incomplete body because of 
these lost “objects.” These objects are lost in an imaginary way and for that reason we have 
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tendencies to fill the hole created by desire (l’objet petit a) by looking in the other body. Through 
this looking, the body’s orifices (like mouth, eyes and anus) and also other parts (breast or penis) 
become sensitive to sexual stimulation. For Merleau-Ponty, orifices are not figurative; they are 
actual holes. According to Merleau-Ponty, the corporeal scheme is as follows: 
My own body scheme, because I see myself, is applicable to all other bodies that I see, it 
is a glossary of corporeality in general, a system of equivalences between inside and 
outside which requires one to be accomplished in the other. The body that senses is a 
desiring body, and esthesiology is extended to a theory of the libidinal body. The 
theoretic concepts of Freudianism are rectified and strengthened when we understand 
them, as Melanie Klein’s work suggests, starting from corporeality that becomes itself 
research of the outside in the inside and of the inside in the outside…54 
 
The body is narcissistic, but it is also an object, in the sense that it stays for the other, for the 
desire of the other. The libidinal body defines the structure of perception that provides a natural 
foundation for the other. And as I have shown above, in the mirror stage, the process is 
reversible. 
As a phenomenon, our body obeys the flesh principle: the body is a phenomenon 
‘phenomenalized’. As a narcissistic entity, the body simultaneously loses and gains its identity 
through the other. What the body loses, in order to achieve its identity, it loses in virtue of a 
primal repression. In phenomenology, this primal repression has been called the phenomenon 
‘phenomenalized’ – a mythical forgetting of something that was never conscious to begin with, 
an original psychical act by which the unconscious is first constituted.
55
 Bodily alienation,
56
 at 
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the mirror stage, involves this primal repression, a repression which represents the alienation of 
desire, when need is articulated in demand.
57
 At the mirror stage, for the first time, the child 
“speaks,”58 recognising his body in the mirror. Lacan asserts in Séminaire 20 that “From the 
moment he speaks, from that precise moment and not before, I understand that there is 
repression.”59 Furthermore, the first repression is more important, not as a specific psychical act, 
but as a structural feature of language itself.
60
  
Repression, according to Lacan, makes language necessarily incomplete. What makes me 
articulate language is the gap between me and the other. The repression of the first signifier 
creates the necessary space (passage) from where expression emerges; it creates the passage 
from the imaginary to the symbolic order, from mute things to spoken things. Between these 
orders lies the space of expression. The space of expression is an ontological “power” because it 
is the shell of being and meaning, of the visible and the invisible: it is the power that brings the 
opposites into each other; it is the Ineinander. The Ineinander is a principle of internal 
organisation with an internal intentionality: it is the keeper of language, or, in terms of Lacan’s 
‘philosophy’, it is the Other. The Other is a place that is given to us as absence and designates 
radical alterity; it is other-ness, which is not an otherness of the imaginary because it cannot be 
assimilated through identification. In other words “there is no Other for the Other”.61 However, 
Lacan asserts that there is a lack in radical alterity because there is always a signifier missing 
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from the signifying chain constituted by the Other. This incompleteness is necessary as feature of 
language itself; for that reason, we do not have access to absolute knowledge: we are in the 
impossibility of ever saying “the truth about truth.”62 Therefore, the Other is the locus in which 
language is constituted. For Lacan speech and language originate outside consciousness; as a 
result, the unconscious is the discourse of the Other. 
The unconscious is structured as a function of the symbolic order. For that reason, the 
unconscious becomes a trans-individual topology. Language presupposes intersubjectivity. As 
Merleau-Ponty asserts in The Visible and the Invisible: 
In fact what has to be understood is, beyond the “person,” the existentials according to 
which we comprehend them, and which are the sedimented meaning of all our voluntary 
and involuntary experiences. This unconscious is to be sought not at the bottom of 
ourselves, behind the back of our “consciousness,” but in front of us, as articulations of 
our field. It is “unconscious” by the fact that it is not an object, but it is that through 
which objects are possible, it is the constellation wherein our future is read – It is 
between them as interval of the trees between the trees. Or as their common level, it is the 
Urgemeinshafttung of our intentional life, the Ineinander of the other in us and of us in 
them.... It is these existentials that make up the (substitutable) meaning of what we say 
and of what we understand. They are the armature of the “invisible world” which, with 
speech, begins to impregnate all the things we see – as the “other” space…63 
 
The unconscious represents the topos of language, of our conscious life: “Language is a life, is 
our life and the life of the things.”64 The unconscious is placed entre deux as a presence-absence. 
Therefore, language is born from “silence” and it “lives only from silence;”65 and “everything we 
cast to the other has germinated in this great mute land which we never leave.”66 Since speech 
and language are intersubjective phenomena, the unconscious is trans-individual.
67
 According to 
Lacan, the unconscious is not, anymore, placed in the interior of the psychic; this reference, as 
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interior, is an effect of the imaginary. In fact, the exteriority of the symbolic in relation to the 
other is the very relation of the unconscious.
68
 
Nothing can help us to answer the question why language is born from silence. Merleau-
Ponty says that there is, somewhere in the interior of language, an intention to signify. Language 
in itself is an autonomous system with an internal organizing principle. Before any human 
convention – I am referring to the need of human beings to translate experience into signification 
or thoughts – there is a language-thing “which counts as an arm, as action, as offense and as 
seduction because it brings to the surface all the deep-rooted relations of the lived experience 
wherein it takes form, and which is the language of life and of action…”69 This mute land is not 
an absolute silence or absolute absence of language: 
born at this depth, language is not a mask over Being, but … the most valuable witness to 
Being, […] the vision itself, the thought itself, are, as has been said, structured as a 
language, are articulation before the letter, apparition of something where there was 
nothing or something else.
70
  
 
Merleau-Ponty affirms here exactly what Lacan asserts about the unconscious, namely, it is 
structured as a language. The depth of the world would be, for Merleau-Ponty, the invisible part 
of the flesh of the being of things. The unconscious is part of the tissue of the world. The 
unconscious is that part of the world that can only be understood through its relation with logos, 
formed as it is by invisible meanings, the inner framework of speech. The unconscious is the 
invisible face of the flesh and the ego is the visible part: both are the “basis of the flesh.”71 The 
flesh of the world takes into account the dehiscence of being through these two faces: the 
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unconscious as a seeing body (corps voyant) and the conscious as a visible world (monde 
visible). 
Trying to lay down a psychoanalysis of Nature I have to consider that my relation with 
Nature is my relation with the flesh, with the mother, as Merleau-Ponty says.
72
 This relation is 
mediated by spirit (Geist). Nature is the field of experiences in which spirit (Geist) links brute 
and expressed being. Only through language can we discern invisible perception. Spirit is the 
‘element’, so to speak, that unites the passage formed in between. The passage is the place from 
where emerge the invisible ideas (flesh essences, as Merleau-Ponty calls them); it is an interior 
principle which organises a linguistic structure: “Thus, there is indeed an interior of language, a 
signifying intention which animates linguistic events and, at each moment, makes language a 
system capable of its own self-recovery and self-confirmation.”73 This principle is both intra-
subjective and intersubjective and is called spirit (esprit): “the anonymous spirit which, in the 
heart of language, invents a new mode of expression.”74 This new mode of expression is, from an 
operational point of view, a dualist one. From an ontological point of view, it is diversity in 
identity. On the one hand, what is given to us in perception would not be evident for us if the 
things were exhaustible. On the other hand, “expression is never absolutely expression, what is 
expressed is never completely expressed.”75 Merleau-Ponty continues: “It is as essential for 
language that the logic of its construction never be of a kind that can be put into concept as it is 
to truth never to be possessed, but only transparent through the clouded logic of a system of 
expression which bears the traces of a past and the seeds of another future.”76 
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 In the working notes to The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty specifies that spirit 
(esprit) is not subjective or objective. What is missing when we affirm that spirit is subjective is 
the conjunctive tissue that unifies speakers in the psycho-historic Lebenswelt.
77
 And what is 
missing when we claim that spirit is objective is the other, or the problem between Egos.
78
 
Merleau-Ponty differs here from Sartre:  
for the argument against the alternative thought of Sartre, which is that it does not make 
up the world, that it does not admit a Weltlichkeit of Geist, that it remains at the subject 
spirit, must not serve to justify a philosophy where all Egos would be on the same plane, 
and which thus would purely and simply ignore the problem of the other, and can be 
realized only as a Philosophy of the Absolute Subject.
79
  
 
As unifying principle, spirit has a place in the passage between logos ediathetos and logos 
prophorikos; it denotes a permanent activity, which can be expressed (or can exist) only through 
the ‘present participle’. The activity of the spirit brings meaning from a silent past to a spoken 
present. Past and present coexist in the moment of the present participle. Spirit emerges in 
realizing a unified structure of unique signification. The structure of unique signification is prone 
to failure. Meaning remains invisible and, for that reason, conscious life is divided.  
Merleau-Ponty understood, following Freud, that conscious life is necessarily fragmented 
(under the name of complex, regression, repression or resistance). The unconscious represents 
everything that is, in our history, locked and on the margins of the passage (between 
expressions), a passage whose function is to create unity of meaning in our life, which Merleau-
Ponty calls spirit. Even if the unconscious is the place where our deepest desire, repression and 
resistance are kept, there is still a common language. The unconscious is structured like a 
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language: 
80
 “we only grasp the unconscious finally when it is explicated, in that part of which is 
articulate by passing into words.”81 Reference to language, speech, discourse and signifiers 
displays, according to Lacan, that the unconscious is an instance caught in symbolic order.  
Language is an intersubjective phenomenon in which the unconscious is ‘trans-
individual’, ‘outside’ itself. This kind of exteriority of symbolic order in relation to human being 
denotes the very notion of the unconscious. In other words, the unconscious represents a 
necessary distance, lack or fragmentation in conscious life. “Consciousness”, as something 
positive, recommences the duality of the reflecting and the reflected, the touching and the 
touched. The untouchable is not an inaccessible touchable and the unconscious is not an 
inaccessible representation. The negative here is not a positive that is elsewhere (a transcendent):  
It is a true negative, i.e., an  Unverborgenheit (unhiddenness) of the Verbogenheit 
(hiddenness), an Urpräsentation (primordial apparition or pre-apparition) of the 
Nichturpräsentierbar (non-primordial-apparition), in other words, an original of the 
elsewhere, a Selbst (Self) that is an Other, a Hollow – Hence no sense in saying: Thought 
or Consciousness is  Offenheit (openness) of a corporeity to …. World of Being.82  
 
Merleau-Ponty, like Lacan, claims that the unconscious, as the untouchable, is a place 
that manifests its absence through what appears as meaning, through something that is visible, 
touchable. Hence, there is no splitting between unconscious and conscious. Speaking broadly, 
Lacan states, one can say that the unconscious is on one side and the conscious on the other:
83
  
It is not coextensive with that order, for we know that, while unconscious motivation 
manifests itself as much in conscious psychical effects as in unconscious ones, 
conversely it is elementary to note that a large number of psychical effects that 
legitimately designated as unconscious, in the sense of excluding the characteristic of 
consciousness, nevertheless bear no relation whatsoever, by their nature, to the 
unconscious in the Freudian sense.
84
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If the unconscious, structured as language, defines the assembly of the world as chiasm, as 
refusal to separate what is exterior from what is interior, then the tissue of the world is a field of 
semantic possibilities.  Merleau-Ponty’s theory of fundamental chiasmatic reciprocity in which 
everything is individualized and brought together by language is not to Luce Irigaray’s liking. 
For Irigaray the intertwining relationship, sustained by language, cannot express, exhaustively, 
the entire structure of the world; the examination of language, as a structure that shores up or 
interlaces between opposites, opens out the “silent discourse”.  
Although Merleau-Ponty tends to universalize embodiment, I shall argue that his thinking is 
so focused on the concrete and the corporeal that it offers great potential for feminist philosophy. 
Starting from Merleau-Ponty’s thinking Irigaray seeks to make woman’s bodily experience 
visible in light of so called phallocentric distortion.   
 
Against the current 
 
In The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty is looking for a new beginning in 
philosophy, a “recommence of everything”85 where the oppositions between subject and object, 
visible and invisible, and I and the world are abolished. Through the notion of the flesh, he will 
unsettle these dichotomies. Flesh is the principle that unifies the opposites. In the last chapter of 
The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty states that the flesh is the principle that supports a 
reversible process called chiasm. The chiasm is identity by opposition and the process which 
opens the phenomenality of the world. This is the true philosophy: “apprehend what makes the 
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leaving of oneself be a retiring into oneself, and vice versa. Grasp this chiasm, this reversal. This 
is the spirit.”86 Reversibility is the ultimate truth.87 
Luce Irigaray disagrees with Merleau-Ponty’s view of the chiasm: it is not an open 
structure but, rather a “closed system”88 or a “closed world:”89  
This reversibility of the world and the I (which Merleau-Ponty refuses to dissociate, to 
separate into two) suggests some repetition of the prenatal sojourn where the universe 
and I form a closed economy, which is partly reversible (but only in the opposite 
direction, if reversibility can have meaning: the in utero providing it, the [substratum] 
hypokeimenon, is more on the side of the maternal-feminine, the future “subject” or seer 
on the side of the world or of things), or some anticipation of a heavenly sojourn, unless 
it is an alliance or a love pact between the world and things.
90
  
 
This sort of indivisibility between the seer and the visible, or between I and the world, does not 
allow for anything new in Merleau-Ponty’s discourse: “Everything is unceasingly reversible…. 
Nothing new happens, only this permanent weaving between the world and the subject.”91 If 
everything is always the same and everything is given, then, for Irigaray, Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of flesh is without questions: “It has no spacing or interval for freedom of 
questioning between two. No other or Other to keep the world open.”92  
The occlusion of otherness, in Irigaray`s view, excludes the feminine. Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy is, accordingly, part of a universal tendency of homogenizing, unifying and refusing 
to accept otherness. In this respect, the feminine was considered as a complementary or inferior 
variation of masculinity, but not thought on its own terms.
93
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In Irigaray’s view, the obliteration of otherness misdirects the feminist towards an ideal 
of equality that tends to eliminate sexual difference. Thematizing the idea of sexual difference, 
Irigaray prepares the way for a philosophy of alterity, where the other is a radical other, 
disproportionate in relation with the I. In An Ethics of Sexual Difference, Irigaray states that 
without determined alterity perception is not possible, nor language: 
If I cannot see the other in his alterity, and he cannot see me, my body no longer sees 
anything in difference. I become blind as soon as it is a question of a differently sexed 
body. I may barely perceived some exterior phenomenon that revels a little of the flesh of 
the visible. Where this is concerned, I remain in darkness, operating on “premonitions”, 
“tact”, “radar”, “wavelengths”? And the abundance of vestimentary compensation 
[suppléance] hardly makes up for the nudity, this dereliction? of my sexed body, devoid 
of carnal visibility.
94
 
 
Chiasm is, accordingly, a repetitive process, without a beginning or an ending. The absence of an 
opening is not a concordance between my body and the other’s body. Chiasm is unachievable 
without a starting moment. For this reason Irigaray introduces the concept of sameness, a 
concept that opens the floor for a “cosmological” debate. Sameness is introduced by way of a 
maternal-feminine concept, through which Irigaray designates the beginning:  
The sameness is the maternal-feminine which has been assimilated before any perception 
of difference. The red blood, the lymph, for every body, every discourse, every creation, 
every making of the world…The sameness is matter and place, universe and things, 
container and contained, contents and envelope, water and firmament. (In the beginning, 
says Genesis, God divided the waters and made the firmament between the waters: those 
under and those above the firmament.)
95
 
 
For Irigaray, the concept of maternal-feminine is a “principle” that makes life possible and, at the 
same time, remains unthought and exposed to a “certain forgetfulness”.96 The mother’s body 
“remains a dusk background, a sleep of oblivion” out of which man erects.97  
                                                          
94
 Luce Irigaray, Op. cit., p. 168. 
95
 Luce Irigaray, Op. cit., p. 98.  
96
 Ibid., p. 162. 
69 | P a g e  
 
The mother-feminine, or the sameness, introduces a new way of thinking, by Irigaray, on 
the singularity of the body and the flesh of the feminine. Even if Merleau-Ponty accentuates 
vision as a primary element of our perception that defines the body, he does not articulate the 
dimension of touching as Irigaray does through sameness. According to Irigaray, touching is the 
dimension of the sensible which is, with predilection, feminine.
98
 Before any vision the sensible 
touches the sensible from which she emerges:
99
  
The woman being woman and potentially mother, the two lips of which Merleau-Ponty 
speaks (the body unites us directly through its own ontogenesis, by welding to one 
another the two outlines of which it is made, its two lips) can touch themselves in her, 
between women, without having recourse.
100
  
 
Irigaray argues for the invisibility of “prenatal sojourn”. Accordingly, a daughter is the 
only one that can have the experience of the mother: “being able to palpate the invisible as the 
mother does (the as is meaningful only through its difference from the impossibility of one who 
never carries an infant in her womb).”101 
Irigaray seeks a sort of topos where women will meet their own essence, a place where 
the lack of the imaginary and the symbolic will facilitate the relation between women and, thus, 
an escape from the male, patriarchal world. This place should be a new beginning, prior to the 
master-slave dialectic; a place that would create proximity without distance between women.
102
 
For these reasons, Irigaray proposes a regression in time, to a moment where nothing is yet 
formed, delimited, identified or spoken.
103
 Starting here, the identity between women will be a 
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perpetual re-engendering of the maternal, giving further rise to a new identity of mother and 
daughter in a never accomplished progression:
104
 
Mother is she who in shadow is in possession of the subterranean resource; daughter is 
she who moves about on the surface of the earth, in light. She becomes woman who can 
in herself unite in her body-womb the most secret, the deepest energy, to life in the light 
of day. Then no longer is the alliance attraction in an abyss, but encounter in the 
flowering of a new generation.
105
 
 
The notion of mother-feminine (mother-daughter) will overcome the notion of chiasm that 
Merleau-Ponty elaborated in The Visible and the Invisible. The proximity without distance, 
between mother and daughter, ensues directly, without mediation by the mirror. What seems to 
be in opposition, as mirror reflection, is reversed in a face-to-face, leaving no place for reflection 
in the other.
106
  
In psychoanalytical terms, the notion of mother-daughter limits the possibility of 
transference, because the symbolic order does not intervene, as mediator, between mother and 
daughter. In other words, the foundation of language is missing in the relation mother-daughter –
phallus. In Lacan’s psychoanalysis the notion of phallus denotes the imaginary and the symbolic 
function of the masculine genital organ.
107
 The concern of psychoanalysis is not the male genital 
organ, in its biological reality, but the role that this organ plays in our life as speaking beings. 
The penis has an important role to play in the Oedipus complex of the little boy, for it is 
precisely via this organ that his sexuality makes itself felt in infantile masturbation; this intrusion 
of the real into the imaginary preoedipal triangle is what transforms the imaginary relation, 
between mother and child, from something pleasurable to something which provokes anxiety.
108
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The child cannot be the object of the mother`s desire, because the father intervenes as a fourth 
element in the imaginary triangle – mother, child and the object (the imaginary phallus) – by 
“castrating” the child. The child cannot identify any more with the imaginary phallus. The real 
phallus is located in the real father, because he is the one that imposes the law, interrupting the 
imaginary “reverie” of the child, as the object of the mother’s desire.109 The real phallus is the 
law (the father) and the imaginary phallus is the object of the mother’s desire (from the child’s 
perspective). The child seeks to identify with this object; the phallus is symbolic. 
Since the beginning, as imaginary object, the phallus circulates between mother and 
child. Becoming an object, the symbolic phallus establishes a structural cycle of imaginary 
threats that limits the employment of the real phallus;
110
 in other words, the child, caught in the 
castration complex, will replace what is missing in relation with the Other (mother). First, the 
child gives up being the object of the mother’s desire, because she lost this position in favor of 
the law (the father that has the real phallus), which introduces a distance between mother and 
child. Second, the child will plug this gap with the symbolic, with the child’s desire to signify. 
Desire mediates between the “power” of the symbolic to signify and the experience of the child 
to perceive the object. The child will replace what he lost from the beginning, l’objet petit a, with 
a new “object”. Lacan sees the game of the child with the reel, which Freud describes in Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle, as a good example of the child’s entry into the symbolic order. Thus, the 
two sounds made by the child (fort/da) represent the first phonetic opposition that denotes the 
presence and the absence of a person or a thing.
111
 In the end, language is the only possibility for 
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human beings to integrate a significance (of course through a symbol), which will express, first 
of all, the death of the thing. The object is not anymore a material thing, it becomes a concept.  
The symbolic denotes what is missing. Castration is the event that places the child in 
relation to language, because, from now on, the child, noticing the distance from the desired 
object, is obliged to use language to articulate its desire. Therefore, for the child, the correlation 
of language and the ability to symbolize lack is fundamental to coherent discourse and social life. 
The child loses something from the beginning (primal repression), something that is not 
articulated in demand, something that will be lost forever. Through repression, the child will 
sacrifice any jouissance (enjoyment). The imaginary object, the phallus, which signifies 
jouissance, is lost, and the child will sacrifice all his impulses towards his mother. 
According to Freud`s psychoanalytical approach, the father is the initiator of castration; 
due to his presence, he makes the child give up the imaginary object. The mother’s desire to give 
birth to a child represents, according to Freud, the symbolic substitute for the phallus which she 
lacks.
112
 Lacan states that the substitute never satisfies the mother: her desire for the phallus will 
persist, even after she has a child. The child will realise that the mother’s desire is the imaginary 
phallus and he will seek to satisfy the mother’s desire by identifying with the imaginary phallus. 
Castration is the crucial event in the child’s life, making the transition from the partial object, an 
object lost forever, to the object a. The object a, as effect of castration, replaces lack with 
fantasies stoking a perpetual desire. The object a is the cause of desire; the object lost and 
replaced by fantasies is the phallus. Therefore, what cannot be articulated in demand (the child 
cannot overcome the authority of the father, the child cannot “ask” to be the phallus for the 
mother) forms a cavity because of the element of primal repression. This loss is symbolised in 
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the unconscious and, at the same time, separates the subject (the child) in his relations with the 
signifier.
113
 It is in this cavity of the signifying chain that the phallus is deposited as signifier.  
The phallus, in traditional psychoanalysis, is the signifier that determines the first 
dialectic of the child with the other. Lacan states in La Signification du phallus:  
The phallus, in Freudian doctrine, is not a fantasy, if by that we mean an imaginary 
effect. Nor is it as such an object (partial, internal, good, bad, etc…) to the extent that this 
term tends to value the reality of a relationship. It is even less the organ, penis or clitoris 
that it symbolised. And it is not without reason that Freud took the meaning of the notion 
of simulacrum in the sense used by the Ancients. Since the phallus is a signifier, a 
signifier whose function, in the inter-subjective economy of the analysis, reveals, 
perhaps, the veil that held in the mysteries. It is the signifier intended to designate as a 
whole the effects of the signified…114 
 
Whereas Saussure argues that the signifier and the signified are mutually interdependent, Lacan 
states that the signifier is primary and determines the signified. Unlike Saussure, Lacan 
accentuates the autonomy of the signifier in relation with the signified, saying that the signifier 
can have a different function than that of signification, namely, the function of representing and 
determining the subject.  What the Lacanian algorithm,  
 
( 
𝑆 (𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑟)
𝑠 (𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑)
 ) 
Figure 1 The Saussurean algorithm, Jacques Lacan Écrits. 
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shows is that the human, as a speaking being, is determined by the signifier without being linked 
with the meaning denoted by the signified.  
Consider the following example and analysis:  
a homosexual confesses his taste for young boys with a certain style, a certain age, young 
boys that can be designated by the expression ‘les p’tite soldats’ (little soldiers). The 
analysis will reveal a memory linked with his mother and long summer afternoons when, 
after long walks, his mother took him to a coffee house and ordered for him, ah, pour lui, 
un p’tit soda (a small soda).115  
 
It would be a mistake to think that according to psychoanalysis, everything is elucidated only by 
remembering some words that a child has heard in childhood. Such a memory may, however, 
contribute to characterise the function of the signifier for a person. How one names the object of 
one’s desire connects to a signifier heard in childhood. Such a signifier persists, if not recognized 
as such. According to Lacan “a signifier represents a subject for another signifier.”116 What 
matters, in the above example, with the notion of soldat (soldier), is not the relation with military 
life, but the relation of the word with what is produced directly by the acoustic image of the 
word, what is produced by the signifier. The denotative function is not given by the word, but by 
the signifier, namely, by the acoustic image that is susceptible to taking on different meanings.
117
 
Lacan states in Écrits that: “The phallus is a privileged signifier of that mark in which the 
logos links with the apparition of desire.”118 The phallus is linked with the notion of jouissance. 
Desire is constituted by a relationship with language. We enjoy only because we are speaking 
beings. Our relation with the world is not immediate: it is mediated by language. Lacan uses, 
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many times, the expression j’ouis-sens to break up the mythic idea of an animal that can enjoy 
itself absolutely, alone, without words, without the intersubjective dimension of language.
119
  
Even though she was a follower of the psychoanalyst, Irigaray’s break with Lacan is 
clearly made in Speculum of the Other Woman. She criticizes the misogyny of philosophical and 
psychoanalytical theories. Later in This Sex Which Is Not One, Irigaray disagrees with Lacan’s 
depiction of the symbolic order and the theory of the phallus as master signifier. According to 
Irigaray, the symbolic is not ahistorical and unchanging.
120
 Language, for Irigaray, is a flexible 
system, largely determined by relationships that define the condition of the human being as a 
cultural being. Irigaray is not convinced by Lacan’s affirmation that the phallus is an ahistorical 
master signifier of the symbolic order, with no connection with male anatomy. For Irigaray, the 
phallus is not a pure symbolic category, but, rather, an extension of Freud’s description of the 
world according to a one-sex model.
121
  
 In Irigaray’s philosophy, the signifier phallus is missing in the mother-daughter 
relationship. Equally missing is the link with language, which Irigaray sees as a construct of 
masculinity. In To Speak is Never Neutral, Irigaray states: 
Unable to create words for themselves, women remain and move about within an 
immediacy having no transitional object or transactional objet. They take-give without 
mediation, commune unknowingly with, and within, a flesh they do not recognize: 
maternal flesh, not reducible to a reproducing body, amorous matter more or less 
unformed, with respect to which there is supposedly no debt and no possible return.
122
  
 
Irigaray’s theory regarding the relationship between women (especially the mother-daughter 
relation), originates in Lacan’s theory of jouissance de l’Autre. In the 1960s, Irigaray started 
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attending the psychoanalytical seminars of Lacan, where she became familiar with Lacan’s 
theory of jouissance. Later, in 1973, in Séminaire XX, named Encore, the concept of jouissance 
became a landmark in Lacan’s psychoanalysis. Lacan states, as does Freud concerning libido, 
that jouissance is basically phallic: “Jouissance, insofar as it is sexual, is phallic, which means 
that it does not relate to the Other as such.”123 However, in the same seminar, Lacan states that 
there is a specific feminine jouissance, a jouissance supplémentaire (supplementary jouissance), 
which is not related to the phallus; Lacan named it jouissance de l’Autre (jouissance of the 
Other). The feminine jouissance is beyond the phallus and is of the order of the infinite, like 
mystical ecstasy.
124
  
The Other, in jouissance, denotes the other sex.
125
 The Other, as the other sex, in Lacan’s 
theory, is woman.
126
 Woman is inscribed on the right side of the psychoanalyst’s diagram of 
sexual difference:
127
  
 
Figure 2 The Diagram of sexual difference, Jacques Lacan, Séminaire XX. 
 
In order to understand the diagram, first note that there is a divide between biological sex 
difference and the theory of the unconscious. The reproductive function of sexuality, for 
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example, is a function that cannot be represented in the unconscious. Nothing can situate, in the 
psyche, the subject as a male or female being.
128
 In Lacan’s psychoanalytic terms, there is no 
signifier of sexual difference in the symbolic order. The only sexual signifier is the phallus and 
there is no female equivalent for this signifier; in other words, there is no symbolisation of 
female sex, as such. In the diagram of sexual difference, above, the left side represents the male 
position and the right side the female position. On the male side, x ~𝐹𝑥 can be read as follows: 
there is at least one x which is not submitted to the phallic function; x Fx can be read: for all x, 
the phallic function is valid. On the female side, ~x ~Fx can be read: there is no one x, which is 
not submitted to the phallic function. ~x Fx can be read: for all not x, the phallic function is 
valid.
129
  
The last formula illustrates the relationship of woman to the logic of the not-all. What is 
clear is the fact that the two formulae contradict each other; each side is defined by both an 
affirmation and a negation of the phallic function. The left side represents the subject and the 
phallus and the right side woman and the big Other. As we can see from the diagram, the relation 
of woman to the Other is not mediated by the phallus. Woman has direct access to the Other; her 
relation with the phallus is partial. There is no symmetry between the two sides. Lacan shows by 
this asymmetry that there is no sexual relationship between man and woman. Lacan does not 
deny the act of sexual intercourse; what he denies is the relation between sexes. In other words, 
Lacan refers to the relation between the masculine sexual position and the feminine sexual 
position in terms of his diagram. There is no suitable jouissance: jouissance is marked by a 
rupture between jouissance phallique and jouissance de l’Autre.  
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The jouissance phallique is the only operator through which we can think the question: 
what is the status of the jouissance of the Other in language? Is the unmediated relationship of 
woman with the Other beyond language? Irigaray’s answer would be affirmative because the 
Other, in her view, is another woman, namely, the mother. Mother is the Other, because she 
designates the maternal and material cause, out of which each of us is formed. Between mother 
and daughter, Irigaray sees a relationship without mediation, a “sameness” that has been 
assimilated before any perception and difference.
130
 Therefore, the primordial relation maternal-
feminine overcomes the castration conducted by the father. This unmediated relationship is 
possible, because woman is not, entirely, part of the phallic jouissance; she has a direct relation 
with the Other.  Because there is no mediation “women remain and move about within an 
imediacy having no transitional or transactional object.”131        
The mother-daughter relationship, Irigaray states, limits transference by “this proximity 
without distance between women, because no symbolic process is able to account for it.”132 We 
are entitled to ask, what is the destiny of women and what do women want? Irigaray’s answer is 
Lacanian: “The wanting of the Other. Not the want of the God-Father, but wanting more. 
Women want the mystery of the infinity of enumeration, the infinitely great, for lack of tactile 
perception for infinitely small, or the infinitely close.”133 According to Lacan, the jouissance of 
the Other is infinite,
134
 because woman does not “exist” entirely in phallic jouissance; in other 
words, the relationship of woman with the Other is not mediated by language, by the phallus 
signifier. 
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For Irigaray sexual difference is a paradox that requires our attention. In contrast, Lacan 
takes the “paradox” of sexual difference as an essential part of the world. He does not place 
women and men in a hierarchy based on sexual position. 
Irigaray’s goal is to bring the maternal-feminine into language. Her answer to Merleau-
Ponty’s theory of chiasm stays at the level of a project. Irigaray’s theory remains suspended 
today. The magnitude and difficulty of the task that she proposed lies in performing a change in a 
world where the subject is, in some way: “archaeologically structured by an already spoken 
language.” Irigaray’s position is to change the entire speaking body, to change the flesh.  
If the change proposed by Irigaray is possible, it should occur beyond the prerogative of 
language, or as Irigaray would say, beyond sexual differences.          
 
 
 
The Chiasmatic World 
 
From Phenomenology of Perception onward, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between the 
notions of universe and world. The concept of universe claimed by science denotes “a completed 
and explicit totality, in which the relationships are those of reciprocal determination.”1 In 
contrast, the world we live in is “an open and indefinite multiplicity of relationships which are of 
reciprocal implication.”2 The world is not an object without fissures and gaps; it is an unfinished 
and indefinite ‘piece of work’. The world has its counterpart within me.3 For Merleau-Ponty, the 
world is “the whole of our experiences of sensible being and of men.”4  
The world is not separated from our existence, our birth and dwelling in the world. The 
world is not a thing; at the same time, world is not separate from things and things are not 
separate from world. Things have roots in the world from where they receive meaning. The 
intertwining of the world and things is the world.
5
 According to Merleau-Ponty, the world 
“seems indeed to be the clearest of truths,”6 because what we see is the world itself. When we try 
to articulate the meaning of the world we enter into a labyrinth of difficulties and contradiction.
7
 
The world is “what we see yet, nonetheless, we must learn to see it – first in the sense that we 
must match this vision with knowledge, take possession of it, say what we and what seeing are, 
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act therefore as if we knew nothing about it, as if here we still had everything to learn.”8 
Merleau-Ponty’s goal is to “observe” how things themselves emerge “from the depths of their 
silence.” 9 The philosopher invites us to go back to the things themselves, to find the naïve 
contact with the world and face the “deep-seated set of mute opinions implicated in our life.”10  
        
The sensible world and the use of language 
 
In opposition to a pensée de survol,
11
 Merleau-Ponty attempts to revalue the sensible 
through a philosophy of interrogation, a new form of reflection from within the situation of 
human existence. For Merleau-Ponty, our being in the world is characterized by a faith in the 
world, not by a knowledge of the world:  
… it is our experience, prior to every opinion, of inhabiting the world by our body, of 
inhabiting the truth by our whole selves, without there being need to choose nor even to 
distinguish between the assurance of seeing and the assurance of seeing the truth because 
in principle they are one and the same thing – faith… 12  
 
Perceptual faith, for Merleau-Ponty, is pre-conceptual. It cannot be reflectively instituted 
by consciousness. Being conceptless, perceptual faith is rooted in the contingency of the 
Offenheit (opening). Perception provides us “with deeper opening upon things… a conceptless 
universality and a conceptless opening upon things.”13 Perceptual faith transposes us from the 
materiality of thing to a dimensional this, which reveals a ‘semantic topology’ of the world. For 
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instance, the vision of the rose is already an introduction into roseness, into the species rose, not 
by an intellectual operation of generalisation, but by a style of visible being.  
All perceptions emphasize our chiasmatic unity with the flesh. As part of the world, 
perception is not rupture (between subjects and objects).
14
 Everything we perceive is the world.  
Barbaras, following Merleau-Ponty’s working notes, claims the sensible gives us a new 
meaning for the verb to be, beyond the dichotomy of existence and essence, objective and 
subjective. In The Visible and the Invisible working notes, Merleau-Ponty writes:  
What is proper to the sensible (as to language) is to be representative of the whole, not by 
a sign-signification relation, or by the immanence of the parts in one another and in the 
whole, but because each part is torn up from the whole, comes with its roots, encroaches 
upon the whole, transgresses the frontiers of the others. … Perception opens the world to 
me as the surgeon opens a body, catching sight, through the window he has contrived, of 
the organs in full functioning, taken in their activity, seen sideways. It is thus that the 
sensible initiates me to the world, as language to the other: by encroachment, 
Ueberschreiten.
15
  
 
Flesh is a primordial condition; it guarantees each moment of visibility. Bodies are sites for the 
coiling back upon itself of the visible. To be in the world presupposes sensibility, sensitivity, 
visibility and tangibility. These qualia reveal nothing less than an intra-ontology, or ontology of 
intertwining. Here begins the paradox of expression.
16
 
The new “ontological rehabilitation of the sensible” describes what Merleau-Ponty has in 
view in the last chapter of The Visible and the Invisible, The Intertwining – The Chiasm: a 
philosophy of the flesh in which the appurtenance of perceiving in the world is itself a 
constitutive dimension of the world. Ontological rehabilitation of the sensible is now everywhere 
decided by language, by the structure of desire, by the matrices of history.  
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Sexuality and expression 
 
Psychoanalysis and phenomenology connect in the context of the Lebenswelt.
17
 By 
introducing sexuality into the reflection on the symbolism of the life world, it becomes possible 
to think that: “life is equally sexual life and sexuality is associated, at the question of its relation 
on the symptomatic world, with the totality of existence.”18 Life possesses a sexual dimension. 
Merleau-Ponty elaborates:  
the true formulation is not ‘everything is sexual,’ but there is nothing that is not sexual, 
there is nothing that can be asexual; beyond the genital is not a distinction or an absolute 
cutting, an ontological character of sexuality, i.e. it is a major contribution in our relation 
with Being.
19
  
 
Sexuality is not explicit; if everything is sexual then sexuality cannot be explained by a single 
direct cause, entirely genital or corporeal. Sexuality cannot be found, as an explicit cause, in our 
daily activities. Being an indirect cause, sexuality gains ontological character: it becomes 
universal.
20
  
In Les institution du mode de la vie, Duportail affirms that: “the extension of sexuality 
over the entirety of existence is not the result of a forcing interpretation, of a hermeneutical 
delirium, which suspects the apparent meaning of words. It is the universal issue of our 
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relationship to being that, itself, will be ‘sexual.’”21  The question, according to Duportail, is: 
what is the ontological character of sexuality? And what is the right signification of the sexual 
character in relation to Being? Sexuality, without being an object of consciousness, influences 
aspects of our experience; sexuality is coextensive with life:  
What we learned, through the material of dreams, phantasms, behaviours and, in the end, 
reverie on the body, it is to discern an imaginary phallus, a symbolic phallus, oneiric or 
poetic. It is not the useful, functional, prosaic body which explains the human being: it is, 
inversely, the human body that recovers its symbolic and poetic significance.
22
  
 
Thinking of the body as an expressive corporeality opens the prospect for a psychoanalysis of 
Nature, or an ontological psychoanalysis.
23
 The body is the unmediated signifier, which does not 
need to be related with an Ego or consciousness to make sense in the world. 
The body is expressive, in two ways: as moved and as unmoved body. The body’s 
expression has its origins in its unmoved experience, as part of the flesh of the world. Consider, 
for instance, a baby, which for its first six months sees herself as an “absolute being”; for that 
reason, her movement appears as a sort of unmoved movement. To extend this analogy I would 
say that unmoved movement can be likened to coincidentia oppositorum. The child will be a 
“baby god” because of her corporeal features, which seem to be, from her point of view, 
boundless. Until the child reaches the mirror stage, we cannot speak about communication, or 
bodily identification. Nevertheless, the child will keep, somewhere in her background 
(unconscious), this image of absolute corporeality. Thus, after the mirror stage, we will be 
                                                          
21
 Ibid., “L’extension de la sexualité a tout le reste de l’existence n’est donc pas le résultat d’un forçage 
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situated in a sort of dual life: on the one hand, the child will accept the mirror image of her body; 
and, on the other hand, the child lives with a permanent anxiety of her absolute body, because 
her body is now a fragmented body.  
The fragmented body is the imaginary one, that is, a sort of ‘drill bag’ of l’objet petite a, 
because pieces of our body are lost, so to speak, in the imaginary. Pieces include the mother’s 
breast, feces, voice, and the look. To this list we will add the phallus, because its absence, 
constituted by l’objet petite a, creates desire, namely, the desire to look in the other’s body for an 
imaginary object a, for an imaginary phallus. Thus, the fragmented body can worship a fetish 
object, in relation to the desired body. Any object may do, for instance, a shoe, a hair 
extension.
24
 However, according to Duportail, the repetition of some erotic emblems in the 
history of literature (the breast, the look, the hair, etc.) can be “considered as a clue of an 
ontological constraint determining the desirable objects.”25 Therefore, what we want is “the clues 
of an irreducible lack.”26 Every day, we annihilate this lack through displacement by natural 
need. But this displacement is nothing other than the everyday fiction played by desire.
27
 
Through a sort of sublimation (by language or partial objects) we satisfy our “desire,” only, in 
part, because we will never get the object that we really want. In other words, I will satisfy the 
(false) need but not the desire. Desire is perpetual because it signifies the effect of primordial 
loss, represented, in Lacan’s theory, by l’objet petite a.  
Duportail affirms that erotic symbols constitute the sensible tissue of nothingness.
28
 
Nothingness, which is, in essence, erotic, is, in its withdrawal, the being of the being perceived 
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and desired.
29
 According to Duportail, this is Merleau-Ponty’s view regarding the rehabilitation 
of the sensible, namely, thinking a sort of accession to Being through the libidinal investment of 
the being. As to the relation of the visible and invisible, being is inseparable from our desired 
being. Our relation with nature is based on our desire for the other, and the other is none other 
than me. 
 
Topology of the body and transference  
 
According to Lacan, the body is not a positive and available being; in fact, it is, as 
Merleau-Ponty affirms in his last work, something dimensional, a living letter, very close to a 
mobile ideogram, instituted by intertwining.
30
 In other words, the body is instituted by 
dimensions which also form the body’s background: “My body is to the greatest extent what 
every thing is: a dimension this. It is the universal thing – But, while the thing becomes 
dimensions only insofar as they are received in a field, my body is this field, i.e. a sensible that is 
dimensional of itself, universal measurement.”31 The body is a dimensional thing, a living letter, 
due to its expressiveness, an ideogram established by the interlacing of several dimensions that 
constitute their own dimension.
32
 Accordingly, the body is the ‘element’ that mediates the 
identity of subject and object. In the same way, intertwining institutes the identity between 
subject and the Other, or, in terms of psychoanalysis, an identity between-three, namely the 
symbolic, imaginary and real.
33
 The Lacanian concept of the Borromean knot expresses the 
intertwining of these three dimension (symbolic, real, imaginary); as Duportail states, “the 
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institution of the expressive body, hinge of the experience of the world, happens only if it is 
favored by the ‘event,’ of the Borromean Knot.”34 The Borromean knot is the “keystone” of the 
world as it appears. 
To construct a psychoanalysis of nature presupposes constructing a topology of the world 
different from Euclidian spatiality. Body, as flesh and first institution in the world, is instituted, 
at the beginning of its life, into a topological world. The child’s spatiality represents his 
manipulative field; the child’s spatiality is created by his coordinated movement. Every 
movement that generates pleasure or displeasure constitutes the topology of the world of the 
child. Even the gesture of caress is part of this topology. In the same way, Lacanian 
psychoanalysis exposes the topology of “le champ de la jouissance” (the edges of the body, 
those areas of the body that open and close). Accordingly, for Lacan, the entire field of being is a 
field of jouissance. The body wants to jouir; but, the body is jouir insofar as it is body as 
expression. Therefore, for Lacan, topology represents the tissue where the patient lives the 
analytical experience. It is where the analytical discourse operates its “notch” (like an indenture 
or a rift). In Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, it is the entre-deux. For Merleau-Ponty, topology 
exhibits the conjunctive tissue of the world, its flesh. The task of language is to articulate the 
world of mute things and the world of things spoken, the logos ediathetos and the logos 
prophorikos. Therefore, both conceptions expose the structure of language conceived as the 
apparatus of the jouissance du corp.
35
  
To understand better the concept of jouissance du corp, I consider here another aspect of 
psychoanalytical experience, namely, the relation of the psychoanalyst and the analysand, which 
is described very well by the torus topology. The torus is a three-dimensional object formed by 
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taking a cylinder and joining the two ends together. According to Lacan, the torus represents the 
chaining of desire with the desire of the Other. Thus, the signifier of the claim
36
 is repeating and 
making an incision, which is rotating around both a circular hole (as Lacan called it, the current-
of-air hole) and the central hole of the torus:  
 
Figure 3 The Torus, Jacques Lacan, Séminaire IX, 1961-1962. 
 
Observe that the claim is rotating around an object, but it is missing the true object of desire, 
which is situated at the central hole. The centre becomes the void of the torus. The hole 
determines the repetition of the unconscious request, the topos of perpetual desire. In Lacanian 
terms this is the place of l’objet petit a. In the psychoanalytical cure, the analysand exhibits his 
unconscious request through repetitive expressions and gestures; in fact, it is a basic 
psychoanalytical principle that a person is condemned to repeat something when he has forgotten 
the origin of compulsion. Thus, if the subject cannot integrate this event into his symbolic 
representation or abstract it from his field of consciousness (through repression), then, according 
to Freud, that event has the value of a trauma. To release the subject, the trauma needs to be 
reduced to a symbol. The trauma perpetually returned – as images, dreams and acting out – 
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becomes integrated in the symbolic organisation of the subject. Through the unconscious request 
of the analysand, the psychoanalyst should be able to identify the alleged trauma, to break the 
circle of repetition, by helping the analysand remember and, at the same time, to help the 
analysand accept that his request will remain unanswered. 
Freud and Lacan give a second interpretation of repetition. Freud radicalises the concept 
of trauma, asserting that there is a primordial trauma that is an intrinsic element of life itself. 
This trauma is the very fact of being born (being in the world).
37
 To live means to take on all 
kinds of roads to reach the point of origin – death. Repetition is subsumed to the death drive. The 
death drive is a general tendency of biological organisms not only to reduce internal vital 
stimulation, but to return to a primitive, unorganized form. Repetition is, accordingly, nothing 
else than a mark left by original and structural trauma and the “infirmity” of the subject. For 
Lacan, the origin of repetition is the meeting of the subject with something that cannot be 
avoided, with something unbearable. If, for Freud, this unbearable meeting refers to death, for 
Lacan it denotes the real, because the real ‘is impossible to be symbolised’.  
According to Lacan, the essence of transference is located in the symbolic order. 
Symbolic transference involves the signifier chain (chaine du signifiant),
38
 in which, Lacan 
states, the human being finds himself as parlêtre. If the signifiers return ceaselessly, it is because 
they depend on the disappeared primordial signifier; in this way, the perpetual return of signifiers 
expresses the eternal nature of desire. Disappearance has the value of an inaugural trauma that 
represents the origin of human desire. In terms of Lacanian topology, disappearance is the place 
of the l’objet petit a, the hole of the torus.  
                                                          
37
 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (W. W. Norton & Company, New-York, London, 1961), pp. 31-
33. 
38
 In English chain du signifiant is translated by ‘signifying chain’. I opt to translate it as signifier chain because 
signifiant in English is translated through signifier and in the end it is about a chain formed by signifiers.  
90 | P a g e  
 
The goal of transference is to clear the place of absence and to make the analysand aware 
that his request to the Other will not be answered. The symbolic brings the real to silence; the 
real becomes a silent platform for symbolic order. The relation of the subject, as parlêtre, with 
objects is a mediated one. The real, defined as the impossible, cannot be completely symbolized. 
The real never ceases to “manifest” itself symbolically. The symbolic introduces a cut in the real 
in the process of signification. In other words, “the real is that which comes back to the same 
place.”39 The real comes back to the same place, the place where the subject is “in so far as he 
thinks, where the res cogitas does not meet it.”40 The real appears to “describe” something that is 
lacking in the symbolic order: “the ineliminable residue of all articulation, the foreclosed 
element, which may be approached, but never grasped: the umbilical cord of the symbolic.”41 
The real, in Lacan’s view, is a topos that supports the symbolic order of our existence. The 
subject is ‘expelled’ from her representation, into her own reality.    
In terms of The Visible and the Invisible, the real may be identified in the concept of 
flesh. Flesh is the tissue that links seeing and the visible, that allows the emergence of 
intersubjective relationship and the chiasm. Merleau-Ponty states:  
There is no problem of the alter ego because it is not I who sees, not he who sees, 
because an anonymous visibility inhabits both of us, a vision in general, in virtue of that 
primordial property that belongs to the flesh, being here and now, of radiating 
everywhere and forever, being an individual, of being also a dimension and a universal.
42
  
 
Like flesh, the concept of the real, in Lacan’s theory, exhibits a primordiality that will become 
the centre of all the representations of the subject. Primal repression is real, inaccessible, lost to 
language, but still in a relation with the symbolic and imaginary order. L’objet petite a, as lost 
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object, constitutes also the intersubjective dimension between analyst and analysand. This object 
represents what the subject is looking for and what she thinks the analyst is hiding.  
The end of analysis refers to the point when the analysand has traversed the radical fantasy 
and accepts the facticity of the real, the facticity of the inaccessible object. In terms of Lacan’s 
topology, the end of transference will reinforce the relation between the three rings (symbolic, 
real and imaginary) by a fourth ring, called sinthome. The sinthome is what allows one to live by 
providing a unique organization of jouissance. 
The binding that brings together phenomenology and psychoanalysis is the topologic 
institution of the body as flesh. The body as flesh, through the nothingness of desire, binds with 
the image of the body and favours an event that constitutes the three-dimensional body: real, 
symbolic and imaginary. Hence, the image of the body and the entire visibility that animates this 
world emigrates, abandoning the body as flesh, into the body as language.   
 
 Lacanian topology 
 
Lacanian topology does not lay the foundation of a new metapsychology, or, as Duportail 
puts it, a mathematical metaphysics of the soul; it is, rather, a schematic reconstruction of the 
sensible space lived through the expression of the body.
43
 I am not referring here to Euclidian 
topology, but to a field of experience based on the bodily experience of the world. Duportail 
examines Jean Piaget’s work on the child’s conception of space. The child’s space is not 
tridimensional: it is correlated with his movement. The child’s space becomes a place elaborated 
by the child according to his drives’ movement. In the same way, says Duportail, Lacanian 
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topology underlies the corporeal experience of space.
44
 Before the six month, the child does not 
have a perception of space or time. In the mirror stage the child begins to perceive his body in 
the mirror at the end of his gaze. Therefore, the space that appears between the child and the 
mirror image is an experimental space created by the child’s movements. The child interacts with 
the other through this space, a space that allows for the reversibility of language. The relation of 
the subject, as speaking human being, with the other, or with his object, is mediated by language. 
Therefore, the child’s mirror image represents only the symbol body of the child. 
The jouisssance du corp finds its rigor only in the interlacing of desire with language and, 
obviously, in the relation with the other. Consequently, the jouissance du corps is opposed to the 
pleasure principle that involves relief of psychic tensions. The body is not a receiver that satisfies 
its need through an object that can fully please its desire. Pleasure and displeasure are concepts 
whose meanings belong to symbolic network systems (to language), hence relief of tension 
transforms into satisfaction of sense. Being-in-the-world means being-in-language as the 
symbolic introduces ‘a cut in the real,’ constituting the process of signification. As Lacan states: 
“it is the world of words that creates the world of things – things originally confused in the hic et 
nunc of the all in the process of coming-into-being.”45 For this reason, the jouissance of the body 
is a jouissance in the field of language: as Lacan used to assert, jouis-sens. Lacan shows that 
jouissance presupposes the intersubjective dimension of language. We cannot enjoy this world 
except insofar as there is another like me who is looking for and needs the same as me. In the 
moment I discover the other, I am into the sensible world and my body begins to jouir. As 
Merleau-Ponty says in The Visible and the Invisible:  
For the first time, the body no longer couples itself up with the world, it clasps another 
body, applying [itself to it] carefully with its whole extension, forming tirelessly with his 
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hands the strange statue which in its turn gives everything it receives; the body is lost 
outside of the world and its goal, fascinated by the unique occupation of floating in Being 
with another life, and making itself the outside of its inside and the inside of its outside.
46
  
 
The “silent labor of desire” allows the body to jouir and “henceforth movement, touch, vision 
applying themselves to the other and to themselves return towards their source” and with this 
“begins the paradox of expression.”47 
The relationship with the other – and, implicitly, the jouissance of the body – is 
supported in Merleau-Ponty’s work by the concept of flesh; flesh is the tissue of the seeing body 
and the visible world. Body and world exist inseparably, one born from another and one for 
another, in a dehiscence which represents the opening of the world. The flesh is being-as-seeing-
visible.
48
 Nevertheless,  
this flesh that one sees and touches is not all there is to flesh, not this massive corporeity 
all there is to the body. The reversibility that defines the flesh exists in other fields; it is 
even incomparably more agile there and capable of weaving relation between bodies that 
this time will not only enlarge, but will pass definitively beyond the circle of the visible.
49
  
 
The flesh of the body is a double sided sheet of being. On one side is a thing among things and, 
on the other side, is the body with which one is seeing and touching.
50
 This dual aspect of the 
flesh of the body – visible and invisible – can be topologically represented by the Möbius strip or 
by the ant drawn by Escher in Möbius Strip II. If we try to imagine some line drawn on the 
Möbius strip we will observe that at a certain moment in time we can see only one aspect of the 
line, we cannot see the other part of the Möbius strip where the line continues. The visible has, 
on its reverse, the invisible and this constitute a structural part of the visible corporeity. 
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Figure 4 Möbius Strip II, M. C. Escher, The Graphic Work of M.C. Escher  
 
In psychoanalysis the analysand discourse analysed by the psychoanalyst (analysing 
speech) is a sort of line drawn unconsciously that reveals a forgotten topological space;
51
 this 
topological space is the primordial structure of the body in the world. 
52
 Speech, like the line 
drawn on the Möbius strip, reveals an invisible topos isomorphic to the structure of the child’s 
expressive body. The analysis of analysand discourse (analysing speech) reveals the spatiality of 
being in the world in accordance with the desiring body.
53
 
 
 The possibility of transference  
 
Lacan’s theory of transference, like Freud’s, passes through several phases. In An 
Intervention on the Transference, Lacan describes transference as a dialectical process occurring 
between analysand and analyst. Transference is not affect displacement from analysand to 
psychoanalyst. Even if transference reveals itself under the appearance of emotion, it only 
                                                          
51
 Duportail, Op. cit., p. 109. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Ibid. 
95 | P a g e  
 
acquires meaning by virtue of the dialectical moment in which it is produced.
54
 Lacan argues that 
despite the fact that transference manifests itself under the form of strong affects, such as love 
and hate, it does not set its meaning from such emotions. Transference reveals the symbolic 
structure of intersubjective relationship. The essence of transference is located by Lacan in the 
symbolic order, not in the imaginary, in spite of powerful imaginary effects resulting from the 
process. Transference involves an act of speech and an exchange of signs that transforms the 
speaker and listener. Hence, the transference is symbolic. Lacan equates the meaning of the 
symbolic with the concept of the gift, similarly to Levi-Strauss. Transference, accordingly, 
relates to the system of exchange that regulates kinship relations. For Marcel Mauss, gifts are not 
free, but compel receivers to respond.
55
 Through the gift, the donor gives a part of themselves. 
The giver instills in the gift a certain power, which requires a response. Gift exchanges play a 
crucial role in creating and maintaining social relationships, by establishing bonds and 
obligations.  
In order to articulate the theory of transference, Lacan returns to Freud and identifies 
symbolic transference in the compulsion to repeat. In Seminar Eight, named The Transference, 
Lacan illustrates in detail the nature of the relationship between analyst and analysand, by 
discussing Plato’s Symposium. Socrates will play the analyst and Alcibiades the analysand. 
According to Lacan, the analyst-analysand relationship is based on love. But what kind of love 
does Lacan have in view? The Greek concept of love, because this concept is the only one which 
describes, in an authentic way, the relationship between analyst and analysand: 
In any case, to enter into this subject, into this dismantling through which this discourse 
of Socrates about Greek love will be something illuminating for us, let us say that Greek 
love allows us to separate out in the love relationship the two partners in a neutral way (I 
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mean by this something pure which is actually expressed in the masculine gender), it is to 
allow there to be articulated at first what happens at the level of this couple who are 
respectively the lover and the beloved, erastes and eromenos… We stopped the last day 
at the position of the erastes and the eromenos, of the lover and the beloved, as the 
dialectic of Symposium will allow us to introduce it as what I have called the basis, the 
turning point, the essential articulation of the problem of love. The problem of love 
interests us in so far as it is going to allow us to understand what happens in transference, 
and I would say up to a certain point, because of transference.
56
  
 
At the beginning, Lacan explains, the love of Alcibiades for Socrates is Eros, something that 
denotes erotic love. Yet, Socrates becomes, through the course of the dialogue, a kind of box 
which encloses something precious. Alcibiades wants, at any cost, the content of that box. This 
latter desire reveals the other type of Eros that we can find in Symposium, namely, divine Eros, 
which begins with physical attraction, i.e., love for the beautiful forms of bodies, but transcends 
gradually towards the Idea of Beauty. However, Supreme Beauty remains something 
unattainable. Thus, just as Alcibiades attributes a hidden treasure to Socrates, so the analysand 
sees his object of desire in the analyst; the object of desire is in this case l’objet petit a: the object 
that the analysand seeks in the Other:
57
 
And it is indeed here that the question is posed for an analyst, namely what is our relation 
to this being of our patient? Nevertheless we know well all the same that this is what is in 
question in analysis. Is our access to this being one of love or not? Has our access some 
relation with what we know about the point we place ourselves at as regards the nature of 
love? This as you will see will lead us rather far, precisely to know that which - if I may 
express myself in this way by using a metaphor - is in the Symposium when Alcibiades 
compares Socrates to some of these tiny objects which it seems really existed at the time, 
to little Russian dolls for example, these things which fitted into one another; it appears 
that there were images whose outside represented a satyr or a Silenus, and  within we do 
not really know what but undoubtedly some precious things.
58
 
 
The analyst, in our case Socrates, becomes the subject supposed to know (sujet supposé savoir); 
as soon as Socrates fulfills this function, transference becomes possible. But how does the 
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analyst accomplish this role? This role is assigned to the analyst by the analysand;
59
 the 
analysand assumes the existence of the subject who knows. He assumes that the analyst knows 
the secret meaning of the analysand’s words, the signification of her utterance, of which even the 
speaker is unaware. According to Lacan, this is the moment that initiates the analytic process.  
The analysand wants to know the secret of the psychoanalyst. For that reason he is 
attracted by the analyst. According to Lacan, the lack that the analysand met in transference 
represents the ‘object’ of desire, and, at the same time, the ‘object’ of love: 
Between these two terms which constitute, as I might say, in their essence, the lover and 
the beloved, you should notice that there is no coinciding. What is lacking to the one is 
not this "what he has,” hidden in the other. And this is the whole problem of love. 
Whether one knows this or not is of no importance. One encounters at every step in the 
phenomenon, its splitting apart, its discordance and a person has no need for all that to 
dialogue, to engage in dialectics, dialektikeuesthai about love, it is enough for him to be 
involved, to love, in order to be caught up in this gap, in this discord.
60
 
 
In the end the analysand should be led by the analyst on that path where she begins to recognize 
that her problems are, in part, the result of her own action, and, hence, of an invisible desire. The 
task, in the primary stages of psychoanalysis, was the recollection of memory and the utterance 
of trauma. The end of analysis, for Lacan, is defined by a moment of enjoyment (jouissance), 
immune to the efficacy of the symbolic.
61
 Thus, the end of analysis would be that pure 
jouissance addressed to no one, because it cannot be shared with anyone; it is a subjective 
‘experience’ beyond language. The end of the analysis is when the analysand ‘gets’ the sinthome, 
or, as some of the French psychoanalysts call it today: to become a saint homme (holy man).  
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The psychoanalysis of nature 
 
Merleau-Ponty is not only able to connect phenomenology and psychoanalysis, but, if 
Jenny Slatman is right, he even considers phenomenology to be “the implicit philosophy of 
psychoanalysis itself. Phenomenology and psychoanalysis are not parallel; much better they are 
both aiming toward the same latency.” 62 In his phenomenological reading of psychoanalysis, 
Merleau-Ponty provides the key for understanding intentionality within ontology. Intentionality 
does not represent, anymore, a possession of the cogitatum but is, instead, an immediate relation 
of a body with another body, an “inner intentionality of Being.”63 In this way, expression, which 
is an intentional act, has its origin in the flesh. If “there is no intelligible world, there is the 
sensible world”64 then there is an inner intentionality that animates the world; with it begins “the 
paradox of expression.”65 This inner intentionality is Merleau-Ponty`s view regarding the 
possibility of an interior ontology, an endoentology. To be means, for Merleau-Ponty, to be into 
the world as a part of the world’s flesh.  
The phenomenology of flesh denotes the dehiscence of being; it is the joint tissue of the 
seeing body and the visible world, they are thought of as inseparable because they are born one 
from the other, from dehiscence. 
66
 The implication of the flesh in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking 
leads us exactly to the core of his project, namely, the enterprise to make understandable how 
language is based upon and intertwined with the natural, anonymous life of the body. Merleau-
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Ponty shows in his last work that his project must be understood as an attempt to explain the 
transition between the body and cultural institutions. This transition is a mutual transference 
between the natural side of our existence and the articulated part of life. Merleau-Ponty names 
this mutual transference chiasm, an intertwining between personal and anonymous life. The idea 
of chiasm concords with that part of the philosopher`s phenomenology that reveals the origin of 
Logos (as linguistic essence) in nature. If the chiasm is the principle that keeps together the 
interior and the exterior, Logos is the law that make a cut into the flesh. Logos is in a diacritical 
relationship with nature, which creates a necessary distance between me and the world.     
What creates the écart (distance, gap) between me and the world is language. To be a 
parlêtre (a speaking being) presupposes a pseudo-parallelism between the transcendental and the 
empirical. Merleau-Ponty’s task is to search for a new balance between these two attitudes. In 
Signes Merleau-Ponty affirms that there is undeniably something between nature as 
transcendence and the immanence of the spirit. The entre-deux brings up for discussion the 
existential variable “x.” What is this “x” between subject and object? The answer, according to 
Duportail is:  
The element “x”, which contests, in act, the annihilation of the Cartesian world, as its 
naturalisation and objectification among things, is, of course, my body. My body is 
certainly an irreducible intra-mundane thing, included in the space-time world and 
submitted to natural causalities, but it is also, and mainly, a thing by which objects exist, 
at least as objects of perception, so that it is not entirely an object like other objects, and it 
appears equally as quasi-subject, as an I-can, carnal, and, at the same time, close and 
different from the I-think.
67
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Our body is neither subject nor object; it is situated before the junction of the subject and the 
object. The anteriority of l’entre-deux appears now as a resumption of the “pre-human” (pre-
humain). The concept of “pre-human,” which is common to psychoanalysis and phenomenology, 
represents, thus, the body of the flesh, the famous Leibkörper and not the ego cogito. The sheer 
point of psychoanalysis and phenomenology will not be the Cogito, but the onto-erotic character 
of the expressive body. 
68
 
For Duportail, the body in question is the phenomenal body. Duportail follows Merleau-
Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible in speaking of the true “reflexivity of the body,” 69 a carnal 
reflexivity: “The feeling that one feels, the seeing that one sees, is not a thought of seeing or of 
feeling, but vision, feeling, mute experience of mute meaning.”70 The body constitutes what 
Merleau-Ponty calls identity in diversity; it may be understood as an intersection of mute 
experience and language (cultural experience), or, as I already claimed, logos ediathetos and 
logos prophorikos. Being entre-deux, the body is not visible but rather invisible: it is “a hollow 
in the visible, a fold in passivity,”71 a topos that constitutes the passage between mute nature and 
cultural world. The body is the root of language, because it is the first institution that opens itself, 
as expression, toward the world; it is, a déplacement quasi naturel (almost a natural 
displacement). The body, as expression, is both natural expression (passive because it is a thing 
among other things) and intentional expression (active because it has the power to perceive). 
This double nature of the body presupposes a quasi- “reflective” perception of the body; in other 
words, the reversibility between seeing and to be seen, or between touching and the touched, 
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denotes the relation between the body and the world. The body and the world are made from the 
same flesh and the world shares the flesh of the body: the world reflects the image of the body:  
The quasi “reflective” redoubling, the reflexivity of the body, the fact that it touches itself 
touching, sees itself seeing, does not consist in a connecting activity behind the 
connected, in a reinstalling of oneself in this constitutive activity. Self-perception 
(sentiment of oneself, Hegel would say) or perception of perception does not convert 
what it apprehends into an object and does not coincide with a constitutive source of 
perception. In fact, I do not entirely succeed in touching myself touching, in seeing 
myself seeing. The experience I have of myself perceiving does not go beyond a sort of 
imminence, it terminates in the invisible, simply this invisible as invisible, i.e. the reverse 
of its specular perception, of the concrete vision I have of my body in the mirror. The 
self-perception is still a perception, i.e. it gives me a Night Urpräsentierbar (a non-visible, 
myself) but this it gives me through an Urpräsentierbar (my tactile or visual appearance) 
in transparency (i.e., as a latency).
72
 
 
The reflexivity of the body is not similar to the mirror perception of the body, because it 
respects the torsion of the body in the non-coincidence of a touching-touch. The recovery of the 
body is not fulfilled due to the l’objet petit a.73 The specular perception of the body will lead us 
to the same conclusion, namely, my perception of the body in the mirror belongs to the 
imaginary order. In other words, it belongs to the speculative reflection that also displays the 
structural delay of consciousness and the withdrawal of consciousness from itself in its own 
reflection (in which consciousness appears as an opacity and latent area).
74
 Therefore, the 
corporeal reflection puts in act an identity between two dissymmetric elements, seeing and seen, 
perceived and perceiving. This kind of identity does not accomplish itself as a consequence of 
something (as you bring some elements together), but only in maintaining a double écart 
(distance) and an entrelacs (interlacing), making an identity in chiasm. 
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On the other hand, (beyond the body) there is the flesh, which, according to Duportail, 
represents a form of reflexivity, which envelopes a part of the unconscious, an irreducible rest.
75
 
The body is nothing other than an exemplary instance of the flesh as the ontological general 
element.
76
 Merleau-Ponty proves that the instance which unveils the world is, at the same time, 
part of the world. Therefore, the appearance of the world, for the body, is the appearance of the 
world through the body; this latter becomes, at the same time, a transcendental element.
77
 The 
notion of transcendental denotes here the seeing body (the perceiving body) that is not visible; 
the body that incorporates in itself the visible part, as a natural part, of this world. For Merleau-
Ponty the openness of the world is envisioned from the interior of the body. The openness is 
possible only by a quasi-tactile reflexivity as part of the body’s topology. The perceiving body 
touches visible things. In turn, the visible knows the general reversible law of the sensible. What 
is visible sheds light on what was invisible; the perceiving body becomes visible because 
everything that is touched is, at the same time, touching. In other words, what Husserl calls 
transcendental ego, in the Fifth Meditation, becomes possible within an empiric body. In 
Merleau-Ponty`s philosophy the border between empiric and transcendental is erased by the 
embodiment of psychic life and, vice versa, by the conceptualization of the world. Regarding the 
intertwining of transcendental and transcendence, Merleau-Ponty states: “The transcendental 
field is a field of transcendences. The transcendental, being a resolute overcoming of the mens 
sive anima and the psychological, goes beyond the subjectivity in the sense of counter-
transcendence and immanence.”78 For that reason, Merleau-Ponty asserts that there is no 
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intelligible world; there is only a sensible world.
79
 The constitution of another monad in me is 
possible only if we put the pure ego in an empirical body. Consequently, the body constitutes the 
other as monad, not the pure ego as such.
80
  
Although the body is the space where the reversibility between interior and exterior, takes 
place, Merleau-Ponty refuses hylozoism. If the body is a topos of subjective life, then the body is 
that space where all phenomena intertwine. The mereology of phenomena is linked with a 
particular spatiality, distinct from physical spaces and times, as a subjective flux of experiences. 
The body image (schema corporel) conjugates the internal sensibility and the exterior in the 
image of the body.   
The body is not visible, it is only a part of the visible; it is incorporated in the visible and 
in this way it can prove its openness to the world from the interior. Merleau-Ponty proves the 
dehiscence of the world by subjecting the body to its tactile reflexivity. For seeing to accomplish 
its vision from the interior of being, since the interior of the world splits to make itself the 
apparition, the eye must be touching things as a hand touches them. As Merleau-Ponty says, the 
gaze envelopes, touches or marries visible things.
81
 The visible lives through, experiences, the 
reversal of the sensible; it starts to see the seeing that sees, in the same way as the touched is 
touching. According to Duportail, the concept that satisfies this dialectical simultaneity of 
interior and exterior is the corporeal schema. The body provides the transference between 
interior-exterior and exterior-interior, because it is animated by desire. The image body 
(corporeal schema) is the element that allows Merleau-Ponty to extrapolate the topology of the 
perceptual field, starting from body as a universal exterior-interior system. The body becomes a 
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place that connects the transcendent and transcendental fields, and where the sensible reveals 
itself. 
A psychoanalysis of nature represents the perpetual ‘movement’ between the gaze and 
the eye (or my invisible body as seeing body and the visible body as seen body) that seeks to 
bring out ever anew the genetic moment of expression. The perpetual interrogation of the “voice 
of silence” characterises the essence of the psychoanalysis of nature. The aim of the 
psychoanalysis of nature is to restart, permanently, our contact with the forgotten, unbearable 
moment of our life that is repressed (mise à l’écart) because it represents an absolute trauma. 
This invisible trauma represents the cause of our cultural world, the cause of language and, in the 
end, the cause of our permanent “research” (desire) as a touching-touched being, whose object of 
perpetual interrogation is placed entre-deux. 
Perpetual interrogation leads towards an intellectual development that doesn’t have a 
theoretical or contemplative purpose. On the contrary, it aims towards an ethical perspective.  
The ethics, in this case, are not about a behaviour adjustment in accordance with a transcendent, 
universal goodness. Ethics here takes the Aristotelian meaning. Ethics is the field of mores and 
human praxis, burdened with contingency.  Ethics implies that the value of an action can emerge 
only after a personal process of deliberation that exhibits the power of choice of the subject and 
its capacity of thinking and desire. Psychoanalytic knowledge of the unconscious and its desire 
mechanisms that animate the subject’s power of decision and reflection, displays an ethical 
perspective: e.g. the subject has to find its desire and place itself in accordance with it. On the 
other hand, if the analysand submits to the force of desire then he will act in agreement with a 
false promise that will lead him to an apparently psychological relief. The fact that the desire 
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returns, shows the true ‘tragedy of the desire’ that it is unfulfilled, anguished and wants to be 
suppressed.  
The ethic of psychoanalysis is the power to assume dissatisfaction in order to create a 
perpetual engine of human desire that leads humans towards an infinite and painful quest.  
In the same manner Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy shows human “tragedy”.  His philosophy 
affirms the human reality that obeys a perpetual desire which cannot be completely fulfilled; 
reality as a self-riddle that becomes clear as a perpetual interrogation. 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of flesh must remain a paradox, an interrogation or an 
unthinkable thought that will lead to reasonable thinking.    
 
      
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s goal is not just to finish Husserl’s philosophy of consciousness, by 
adding to the subject the embodiment phenomenon and to the object the world as a constitutive 
field. Merleau-Ponty aims at an intra-ontology, to elaborate the ontology of the flesh. The 
ontology of the flesh is not incarnation, but an intertwining phenomenon, the chiasm between the 
world and the subject, flesh and language. The world has its foundation in a reversible 
relationship or chiasm . This relation keeps the world united and, at the same time, allows the 
(same) world to be split in order to create meaning. 
To show that the psychoanalysis of nature refers to this (intra) worldly relation – between 
‘me’ and the other, between ‘me’ and nature – I began by examining Husserl’s concept of 
Lebenswelt. The late Husserl of The Crisis is the philosopher who found, indirectly, the ‘field’ 
for a theoretical debate and possible meeting between Lacan and Merleau-Ponty. This ‘field’ 
intersects and binds “two different forms of psychoanalysis.”1 The idea of the intuition of the 
lifeworld, in the context of meaningful life, appears in The Crisis, but, as we saw, meaning is 
not, as Husserl thought, imposed by the transcendental ego. For Merleau-Ponty, the human being 
is an agent in the lifeworld and for that reason he cannot be reduced to an act or a representation. 
Human being is life itself. If ‘to live,’ for Husserl, means to live in a certainty of the world and 
this certainty is given by conscious life; for Merleau-Ponty ‘to live’ means to be a being of 
meaning, institutionalised by the body as the first expression of the world.  
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The body is the first element in the world and it mediates the first transfer – between the 
gaze and the eye – that leads to the constitution of the ego, for both Merleau-Ponty and Lacan. 
Analysis of the body, as the first institution in the world, represents a first step in showing how a 
psychoanalysis of Nature is possible. The body as the instituted element that mediates the 
relations of seeing-seen and touching-touched represents, in the end, a mutual transference, a 
‘movement’ between a body and the other, and between flesh and language. The flesh of the 
world, in the last analysis, explains the lived body and not vice versa.
2
 The flesh is not the body 
itself and it cannot be reduced to a thing.  
A chiasm is the non-coincidence and intertwining of opposites. The flesh sustains the 
chiasm: “The flesh is a mirror phenomenon and the mirror is an extension of my relation with 
my body.”3 A mirror phenomenon is the achievement of the image of the thing. The flesh 
includes both active and passive principles. The flesh, as passive principle, supports the relation 
of the body with its image in the mirror, as a reflection and projection of the ego. As active 
principle, flesh designates an otherness, a radical alterity. Flesh is the Other, the radical alterity 
inscribed in the symbolic order, “beyond” the imaginary, in the domain of language and law. In 
Merleau-Ponty’s words, the flesh “is the mother”4 because she is the first big Other for the child. 
She is the first to deal with the child’s primitive cries and retroactively sanctions them as 
particular messages. The symbolic order is present in the figure of the mother, who carries and 
supports the child. The mother ratifies the child’s image in the mirror. Hence, the child identifies 
herself only through the eye of the Other. The flesh as the mother (as another subject) must be 
interpreted as secondary to the meaning of the Other as the topos of language. Language emerges 
from the flesh, from the mother, from Nature.  
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Language originates, for Lacan, not in the ego, not in the subject, but in the Other. 
Language is beyond one’s conscious control. Language emerges from another place, outside 
consciousness, from an anonymous locus; hence the unconscious is the discourse of the Other.
5
 
Discourse of the other place, or discourse from another place, denotes Merleau-Ponty’s sense of 
Nature: “Nature is what has a meaning without this meaning being posited by thought: it is the 
auto production of meaning.”6  
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of nature finds its roots in Husserl’s fight against naturalism, 
where Merleau-Ponty discovers the concept of Verflechtung (the intertwining) that brings 
together the psychic and the corporeal. If the subject wants to reach the intuition of nature he has 
to turn against his own nature. Nature is the topos in which the distinction between subject and 
object, spirit and body, language and flesh is abolished. A psychoanalysis of Nature requires 
mediation by a principle of reversal, a reciprocal intertwining of opposites. 
Reflection, through which the subject detaches from the world, can only be motivated by 
a prior intertwining of the same subject with the world. Such a thought of intertwining (chiasme) 
is not, for Merleau-Ponty, a result of the overcoming of opposites, as in Hegel’s dialectic. 
Chiasm, according to Merleau-Ponty, is prior to any dialectical progression. The chiasm is 
supported by the principle of this world, which is flesh. In an attempt to rehabilitate the idea of 
Nature, Merleau-Ponty disagrees with Hegel’s dialectic of negativity. For Merleau-Ponty there is 
a prior and simultaneous process that allows a double polarity of reflection. The reflection by 
which the subject is trying to detach itself from the world is a reflection that is, at the same time, 
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a part of the world. It is a reflection that cannot be installed in an active constituting agent, but 
finds itself as self at the origins of every reflection.
7
  
Nature, for Merleau-Ponty is primordial, the non-built, the non-instituted; Nature and 
history are inseparable. Every phenomenon is part of culture and history. Nature is the auto 
production of its own meaning. The body, which is part of nature as organism, is as well a 
‘cultural object’, a power of expression, the trace or the sedimentation of an existence. Nature is 
the perceptible support for the body; the body becomes the first expression of nature in the 
world. Perception belongs to a natura naturata insofar as the subject is embodied in nature. 
Perception is part of natura naturans insofar as the perceiving subject is spirit, history, 
productivity and liberty. In this respect we are compelled to admit that all meanings are not the 
product of our consciousness, but part of an ontological structure, which Merleau-Ponty calls 
chiasm.  
Nature embodies passive and active principles indicating both a cosmology and an 
entelechy of Nature. The world as topos of phenomena already establishes a priori a certain 
arrangement, a wild cosmos, a nature. For Merleau-Ponty, the world is not only what appears to 
us as Cartesian “artefacts”, or as a place of beings gathered together by the opening of being 
around (in-der-Welt-sein); it is a carnal universe, a “polymorphic matrix”8 of phenomena, held 
together by the flesh as principle of the world.  The chiasm is a sort of “bastard concept,” an 
element of intersection, situated in between. Nature, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, is reversibility, 
enjambment and caesura, in other words, chiasm. Reversibility as “ultimate truth,”9 is based on a 
principle that is turning on oneself, which Merleau-Ponty calls flesh and which does not require 
any synthesis. Flesh lies on the non-absolute feature of the opposition between negative and 
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positive and active and passive. Flesh is not the antithesis of the idea or of speech; it is a passage 
from the mute world to the speaking world. Chiasm is a two-way passage that institutes almost 
carnally the idea as a “sublimation of the flesh”.10  
The concept of flesh “intrudes” upon Freudian psychoanalysis. By way of ‘flesh’, 
psychoanalytic architecture, based on notions like pleasure, desire, love, Eros, is suddenly 
explained. One stops seeing all these notions as positive or negative. The way one should see the 
world is “as differentiations of one sole massive adhesion of Being which is flesh.”11 
Accordingly, Freud’s psychoanalysis is, Merleau-Ponty states, not a philosophy of the body, but 
a philosophy of the flesh. 
12
 Concepts, such as the conscious, and the unconscious should be 
understood thorough the notion of the flesh.
13
 Flesh, or, in other words, Nature, must be seen as 
the other side of man, as a description of the man-animality intertwining
14
 and a place from 
where Logos emerges. 
Lacan conceives the Id as the unconscious origin of speech. The symbolic pronoun ‘it’ is 
beyond the imaginary ego. The happy error of the fall into language is the effect of an unknown 
phenomenon that is itself structured like a language: for Lacan this is the unconscious and for 
Merleau-Ponty this is Nature. There is a place where vision and thought “are articulation before 
the letter,”15 before the symbolic, but also before the imaginary. The Id content is occupied by 
signifiers, and all this ‘structure’ is already in the real.16 The unconscious is ‘already there’ as 
trans-individual
17
 topos, placed in-between. It guarantees the intertwining transference from the 
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mute state of Nature, as logos endiathetos (logos of life) to the cultural world, as logos 
prophorikos (the operating language).  
According to Irigaray, Merleau-Ponty’s theory of chiasm is a repetitive process without a 
beginning or an ending. Irigaray introduces the concept of sameness. Sameness brings forward, 
prior to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of vision, the experience of touching. For Irigaray, ‘touching’ 
before ‘vision’, describes a primordial dimension lived by the relation mother-daughter. The 
concept of mother-daughter, according to Irigaray, shows proximity without distance; this means 
that there is no room for language and, therefore, no room for any kind of relation mediated by 
language. The concept of mother-daughter limits the theories of transference and chiasm because 
the symbolic, as mediator, between mother and daughter, does not exist. Accordingly, the 
foundation of language is missing: thus, the relation mother-daughter is outside Lacan’s theory 
of transference and Merleau-Ponty’s theory of chiasm. Both latter theories are structurally 
supported by language, which, in Irigaray’s view, is inconceivable. The relation mother-daughter 
is beyond language. For Irigaray, the mother-daughter concept is supposed to be a new beginning 
in philosophical reflection and in psychoanalysis. If for Merleau-Ponty the foundation of 
language is supported by a reversible principle, for Irigaray, language, which is sexuated, should 
encounter, through speech, a sex which is irreducible to it and with which it is impossible to have 
a relation of reversibility without remainder.
18
 Irigaray argues that mother-daughter will 
introduce a new “dimension” in psychoanalysis: “touching”. The concept of touching generates a 
sort of harmony with the self, both prior to and beyond the closure of language, a harmony that 
lets the other be. “Touching” opens up towards a sort of reserve beyond the symbolic order, a 
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topos where transference takes place, allowing the analyst to guarantee his or her own seclusion, 
and to guide the other in or toward his or her own.
19
   
Even if Irigaray`s work is best understood as input in a fecund exchange with Merleau-
Ponty`s texts which contributes to an ongoing project to show the failure of philosophy and 
psychoanalysis as a whole to address the feminine, in Merleau-Ponty and Lacan`s defense, it 
should be said that both of them leave room for the other, which saves them from the baits of 
solipsism.         
In the third chapter I focused on the concepts of chiasm and transference: apparently two 
different concepts, with operational meanings in two apparently different fields, yet they come 
together in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh. The libidinal body is the body that wants to 
jouir inasmuch as there is a meaning that can mediate its jouissance. In other words, the 
topological analysis of the body helps to express and to understand the meaning of the 
ontological metamorphosis of the body. The multi-dimensional body involves, as well, the 
possibility of the human being as part of the world, as a constitutional element of the 
intertwining (body-world). To live in this world is possible only through the sensible 
embodiment of the perceiving and perceived, as a result of the ‘carnal’ knot between exterior and 
interior. As I showed above, this knot exhibits Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the psychoanalysis of 
nature. It denotes the transference movement – which is a “movement” of the flesh – between 
me and the other. This intertwining originates in the life path of a foundational dimension (the 
real), which separates and connects the dimensions. 
Starting from the posthumous meeting between Lacan and Merleau-Ponty, I show that 
phenomenology and psychoanalysis are rejoined via the topology of the body, as first institution 
in the world, through the perspective of the ontology of the flesh that brings forward a 
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philosophy of chiasm. The analysis of the topology of the body allowed understanding of the 
ontological metamorphoses of the body, namely, body as flesh. The body of flesh is not a 
positive entity, but a ‘dimensional thing’ or, rather, a tridimensional thing. I articulated three 
forms of the body (real, symbolic and imaginary) through the concept of the Borromean knot, or, 
in other words, the Borromean knot of the body as flesh. The intertwining of the three 
dimensions, as an internal constitutive process of the ‘institution’ of the body, shows that 
housing the world is possible only by virtue of the embodiment of the sensible and of the 
perceiving-perceived reversibility: the carnal intertwining of the exterior and the interior.  
The constitution of the ego obeys the structure of the phenomenon that Merleau-Ponty 
calls chiasm or reversibility. This structure is articulated around a hole or an empty centre, that is 
formed, in psychoanalysis, by l’objet petit a (object little-a). It is the immemorial aperture, that 
precedes us every day and which is instituted on the I (am) perceiving, I (am) speaking, I (am) 
thinking; on someone who does not know anything; the first person who is a non-person. The 
constitution of the subject has its place in the moment of chiasm, which is the medium of the 
work of culture. 
The psychoanalysis of Nature, proposed by Merleau-Ponty, can be defined as a new 
dialectic without synthesis as the third moment. Synthesis is implied from the beginning and 
supports the chiasm.  We do not presuppose that we can find an absolute. To speak and to live 
are the source of this anonymous included middle that forms the chiasm. The indefinite middle is 
the pre-personal subject, that brings together corporeal life and human life, the present and the 
past. There is something (a synthesis) that brings together and, at the same time, refuses to break 
up its opposites (interior and exterior). The anonymous is conceived by Merleau-Ponty as the 
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primordial One (Other) that has its own authenticity; it never ceases, but continues to support 
adult life and to be experienced anew in each of our perceptions.
20
 
 To repeat Merleau-Ponty: "Nature is at the first day": it is there today. This does not 
mean Nature has an original first day, a time of indivision. The beginning is a principle still 
between us today: it is the flesh of the world, which is "ever anew" and "always the same."  
If there is truly a link, as we stated in this work, between Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of 
chiasm and Lacan’s psychoanalysis (theory of transference), then this meeting point is a 
psychoanalysis of Nature. Through psychoanalysis of Nature, Merleau-Ponty will change the 
way in which philosophy elaborates the structure of the world. A psychoanalysis of Nature, in 
my opinion, attempts not only to theorize an abstract philosophical idea, but, also, to construct a 
new “course of action” for philosophers. A first step for the philosopher is to accept and embrace 
the unknown as something that emerges in between and constitutes the human being. Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenological structure named chiasm is articulated around a hole, an absence. The 
abyss is the Anonymity that holds itself as the enigma of the world and reveals itself as an 
immemorial aperture, which precedes us. The acceptance of the unknown puts the philosopher in 
a permanent state of interrogation, which will lead her to be more adaptive, more aware of what 
motivates her in the first place.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 Merelau-Ponty, Signes,  p. 173. 
115 | P a g e  
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Alexandra Renault, Nature et Subjectivite, L’enigme de l’homme chez Freud et Merleau-Ponty, 
HAL, tel.archives-ouvertes.fr, 2012. 
Barbaras, Renaud. A Phenomenology of Life, Cambridge Companion Online. Trans. Taylor 
Carman and Mark B. N. Hansen. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
—. Le conscient et l'inconscient, Notion de philosophie, Tome I. Paris : Gallimard, 1995. 
—. Merleau-Ponty. Paris : Ellipses, 1997. 
Chanter, Tina. Wild Meaning, Luce Irigaray's Reading of Merleau-Ponty; Chiasm, Merleau-
Ponty's Notion of Flesh. New York : State University of New York Press, 2000. 
Chemama, Roland. Dictionnaire de la psychanalyse. Paris : Larousse , 2009. 
Dastur, Françoise. Chair et Langage. Paris : Les Belles Lettre , 2016. 
Derrida, Jacques. Speech and Phenomena. Trans. David B. Allison. in French La Voix et le 
Phénomène Evanston, 1967 : Northwestern University Press, 1973. 
Dupont, Pascal. Dictionnaire Merleau-Ponty. Paris : Ellipses, 2008. 
Duportail, Guy-Felix. Les institutions du monde de la vie, Merleau-Ponty et Lacan. Grenoble : 
Jérôme Million, 2008. 
Escher Maurits Cornelis, The Graphic Work of M.C. Escher, Ballantine Books, New York, 
1975. 
Evans, Dylan. An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis . London and New 
York : Routledge, 1996. 
Foucault, Michel. Theatrum philosophicum in Critique 282. Paris : PUF, 1970. 
Freud, Sigmund. Study on Hysteria. s.l. : Ivan Smith, 2000, 2007, 2010 . 
—. The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex Work. Trans. Joan Riviere. in German Der 
Untergang Des Odipus Komplexes, 1924. London : The Hogarth Press and The Institute of 
Psycho-Analysis, 1961. 
116 | P a g e  
 
—. The Interpretation of Dreams. Trans. James Strachey. in German Die Traumdeutung, 1899. 
New York : Basic Book, 2010. 
Hegel, G. W. F. Philosophy of Mind. Trans. William Wallace and A. V. Miller. New York : 
Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. in German Sein und Zeit, 1953. 
New York : State University of New York Press, 1996. 
Husserl, Edmund. Cartesian Meditation . Trans. Dorion Cairns. Husserliana (Haag, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1950) Boston : The Hague, 1982. 
—. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Trans. David Carr. in 
German Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie: 
Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, 1954. Evanston : Northwestern 
University Press, 1970. 
Irigaray, Luce. An Ethics of Sexual Difference. Trans. Carolyn Bruke and Gillian C. Gill. in 
French Ethique de la difference sexuelle, 1984. New York : Cornell University Press, 1993. 
—. This Sex Which Is Not One. Trans. Catherine Porter and Carolyn Bruke. in French Ce sex qui 
n;en est pas un, 1977. New York : Cornell University Press, 1985. 
—. To Speak is Never Neutral. Trans. Gail Achwab. in Frrench Parler n'est jamais neutre, 1985. 
New York : Routledge, 2002. 
Jenny Slatman, The Psychoanalysis of Nature and the Nature of Expression, in Chiasm 
International (Vrin, Mimesis, University of Memphis, 2000), 
Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Paris : Edition du Seuil , 1966. 
—. Écrits. Trans. Bruce Fink. in French Écrits, 1966.  New York : W. W. Norton & Company, 
2006. 
—. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XX. Trans. Bruce Fink. In French Le Seminaire, Livre 
XX, Encore, 1975. New York : W. W. Norton & Company,1999. 
—. Encore. Dublin : Cormac Gallagher, 2004. 
—. Les écrits techniques de Freud 1953-1954. Paris : édition Point, 2009. 
—. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I, Freud's Paper on Technique. Trans. John Forrester. 
in French Le Seminaire I, 1975. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
—. Seminaire II. Paris : Document interne à l'Association freudienne internationale et destiné à 
ses membres, 1954-1955. 
117 | P a g e  
 
—. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III The Psychoses 1955-1956.Trans. Russell Grigg. in 
French Le Seminaire, Livre III, Les Psychoses,1981. London : Routledge, 1993. 
—. Séminaire IV 1956-1957. Paris : Document interne à l'Association Freudienne et destiné à ses 
membres, 1956-1957. 
—. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII. The Ethic of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960. Trans. 
Dennis Porter. in French Le Seminaire, Livre VII, L'ethique de la psychanalyse, 1986.  London : 
Routledge, 1992. 
—. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VIII. Dublin : www. lacaninireland.com, 1960-1961. 
—. Séminaire IX. Paris : Document interne à l'Association Freudienne et destiné à ses membres, 
1961-1962. 
—. Seminar XI. : Document interne à l'Association freudienne internationale et destiné à ses 
membres, 1964. 
—.Seminar XI. : The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. Trans. Alan Sheridan, W. 
W. Norton & Company, New York: 1998.     
—. Séminaire XVIII. Paris : Document interne à l'Association Freudienne et destiné à ses 
membres, 1970-1971. 
—. Séminaire XX. Paris : Document interne à l'Association freudienne internationale, 1972-1973. 
—. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. Trans. Alan Sheridan. Le Seminaire de 
Jacques Lacan, Livre XI, Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse, 1973. New 
York : W. W. Norton & Company, 1998. 
Levi-Strauss, Claude. Structural Anthropology. Trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest 
Jacobson. Copyright 1963. New York : Basic Book, 1963. 
—. The Elementary Structures of Kindship.Trans. James Harle Bell, John Richard von Sturmer 
and Rodney Needham. in French Les Structures élémentaires de la Parenté, 1949. Boston : 
Beacon Press, 1969. 
Mauss, Marcel. The Gift. Trans. W. D. Halls. in French Essai sur le don, 1950. London : 
Routledge Classic, 2002. 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Child Psychology and Pedagogy, The Sorbonne Lecture 1949-1952. 
Evanston : Trans. Talia Welsh. in French Psychologie et pédagogie de l'enfant: Cours de 
Sorbonne 1949-1953, 2001.Northwestern University Press, 2010. 
—. La Nature, Notes Cours du Collège de France. Paris : édition du Seuil, 1995. 
118 | P a g e  
 
—. Le visible et l’invisible. Paris : Gallimard, 2007. 
—. L'homme et l'adversite. Quebec : Pierre Patenaude , 2011. 
—. Notes de Cours, 1959-1961, Paris: Gallimard, 1996. 
—. Phenomenology of Perception. London and New York : Routledge , 2002. 
—. Phenomenology of Perception. London and New York : Routledge, 2005. 
—. Signes. Québec : Pierre Patenaude, 2011. 
—. The Prose of the World. Evanston : Trans. John O'Neill. in French La Prose du Monde, 1969. 
Northwestern University Press, 1973. 
—. The Visible and the Invisible. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. in French Le Visible et l'invisible, 
1964. London and New York : Routledge, 1968. 
Murrary, Chambers. Latin-English Dictionary. London : Edinburgh, 1983. 
Plato. Legile (Laws). Bucharest : editura Iri, 1995. 
—. Timaeus. Bucharest : editura Stiintifica, 1995. 
—. Timaeus. Trans. Benjamin Jowett.Teddington : Echo Library, 2006. 
Richir, Marc. The Meaning of Phenomenology in The Visible and the Invisible; Thesis Eleven, 
No. 36. Boston : Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993. 
Russon, John. The Self and Its Body in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. Toronto : University of 
Toronto Press, 2001. 
Scott L. Marratto. The Intercorporeal Self, Merleau-Ponty on Subjectivity. New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2012. 
 
Stephen H. Watson, Reading the Barbarous Source, Merleau-Ponty’s Structural History and 
Schelling, in The Barbarian Principle, Merleau-Ponty, Schelling, and the Question of Nature, 
Edited by Jason M. Wirth with Patrick Bruke. State University of New York Press, Albany, 
2013.  
 
Williams S. Hamrick and Jan Van Der Veken, Nature and Logos, A Whiteheadian key to 
Merleau-Ponty's Fundamental Thought.  State University of New York Press, Albany, 2011. 
 
 
 
119 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
